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ABSTRACT 
 
Natasha H. Duarte: Hot People: Automated Profiling, Pre-Crime Investigation, and the 
Fourth Amendment 
(Under the direction of Cathy Packer) 
 
 
 This thesis explores the legal and policy implications of tools that use data mining 
and automation to predict the likelihood that an individual will commit a future crime. It 
refers to these algorithms as “automated profiles” because, like analog crime profiles 
such as the drug courier profile, the algorithms rely on facially innocent characteristics as 
indicators of criminal activity. The first half of this thesis discusses how the Fourth 
Amendment case law concerning the drug courier profile might apply to automated 
profiling. The second half discusses various policy concerns raised by law enforcement 
agencies’ use of automated profiling systems. This thesis concludes by making several 
recommendations for the police departments that use these systems, the agencies that 
may regulate them, the computer scientists who develop them, and the judges who will 
review them. 
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CHAPTER 1: HOT PEOPLE
 
Introduction 
 
Four hundred Chicago residents received surprise visits from the police in 2014.1 
During the visits,2 the residents were warned of the consequences of engaging in criminal 
activity.3 The residents were on a “heat list” of the 400 Chicago residents most likely to 
commit a violent crime. 4 Heat lists traditionally consist of individuals with outstanding 
warrants, but this list was different—some individuals on the list had no criminal record 
or warrant and were not suspected of a crime already committed.5 How did the Chicago 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See CIVIL RIGHTS, BIG DATA, AND OUR ALGORITHMIC FUTURE [heretofore “BIG DATA FAIRNESS 
REPORT”] 18 (September 2014), https://bigdata.fairness.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-04-20-Civil-
Rights-Big-Data-and-Our-Algorithmic-Future-v1.2.pdf. 
 
2 These visits are called “custom notifications.” GARRY F. MCCARTHY, CUSTOM NOTIFICATIONS IN 
CHICAGO – PILOT PROGRAM D13-09, http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives-mobile/data/a7a57bf0-
13fa59ed-26113-fa63-2e1d9a10bb60b9ae.html?ownapi=1 (last visited Nov. 4, 2015). 
 
3 Id.; see also Tony Dokoupil, ‘Small World of Murder’: A Homicides Drop, Chicago Police Focus on 
Social Networks of Gangs, NBC NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/small-world-murder-
homicides-drop-chicago-police-focus-social-networks-f2D11758025. 
 
4 See BIG DATA FAIRNESS REPORT, supra note 1; McCarthy, supra note 2; Dokoupil, supra note 3; Jay 
Stanley, Chicago Police “Heat List” Renews Old Fears About Government Flagging and Tagging, AM. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION: FREE FUTURE BLOG (Feb, 25, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/chicago-police-
heat-list-renews-old-fears-about-government-flagging-and-tagging. 
 
5	  See, e.g., John Eligon & Timothy Williams, Police Program Aims to Pinpoint Those Most Likely to 
Commit Crimes, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/us/police-
program-aims-to-pinpoint-those-most-likely-to-commit-crimes.html (reporting on similar programs in 
Kansas City and other areas); Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., The New Science of Sentencing, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-
sentencing (explaining a new sentencing program considered in Pennsylvania that would use predictive 
analytics to determine whom to parole based on likelihood of committing future crimes); Nate Berg, 
Predicting Crime, LAPD-Style, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/jun/25/predicting-crime-lapd-los-angeles-police-data-analysis-
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Police Department determine who was most likely to commit a crime? The list was 
compiled by a predictive policing model —a computer algorithm that uses big data and 
machine learning to predict future criminal activity.6 These models, developed and sold 
by private companies, have become increasingly popular among local law enforcement 
agencies.7 Police departments promote the ability of predictive policing models to reduce 
crime,8 but few details about how the models work and what data they use have been 
released to the public.9  
In Fresno, California, a predictive program called Beware assigns “threat scores” 
to individuals who call 911.10 The score—red, yellow, or green—is displayed to the 911 
operator so that responders can prepare for potentially dangerous encounters.11 Beware 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
algorithm-minority-report (describing the Los Angeles Police Department’s use of PredPol’s predictive 
policing software, which uses weather prediction technology to map and forecast crime by neighborhood). 
6 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L. J. 259, 265 
(2012). Ferguson’s research focuses on predictive policing tools that map crime and attempt to forecast the 
neighborhoods where particular types of crime are most likely to occur. See generally Id. These crime 
mapping functions are different from the models this thesis discusses, which target individuals rather than 
geographic areas, but both types of tools fall under the predictive policing umbrella.  
 
7 See, e.g., John Eligon & Timothy Williams, Police Program Aims to Pinpoint Those Most Likely to 
Commit Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/us/police-program-
aims-to-pinpoint-those-most-likely-to-commit-crimes.html (reporting on similar programs in Kansas City 
and other areas); Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., The New Science of Sentencing, THE MARSHALL PROJECT 
(Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing (explaining 
a new sentencing program considered in Pennsylvania that would use predictive analytics to determine 
whom to parole based on likelihood of committing future crimes); Nate Berg, Predicting Crime, LAPD-
Style, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/jun/25/predicting-crime-lapd-
los-angeles-police-data-analysis-algorithm-minority-report (describing the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s use of PredPol’s predictive policing software, which uses weather prediction technology to 
map and forecast crime by neighborhood). 
 
8 Dokoupil, supra note 3 (describing Chicago police leaders expressing optimism about their social network 
gang audits, jokingly referring to their “pre-crime unit,” and “radiating . . . a glow more often found 
onstage at TED talks”). 
 
9 See, e.g., BIG DATA FAIRNESS REPORT, supra note 1. 
 
10 Id.; David Robinson, Buyer Beware: A Hard Look at Police ‘Threat Scores’, EQUALFUTURE (Jan. 14, 
2016), https://www.equalfuture.us/2016/01/14/buyer-beware-police-threat-scores/. 
 
11 See Robinson, supra note 10. 
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uses information from commercial data brokers, which comb the Internet and compile 
available data on individuals.12 This can include everything from criminal records to 
social media activity to health information.13 
 Predictive policing models are the latest step in a long history of attempts by law 
enforcement to predict and prevent crime before it occurs.14 There are different types of 
predictive policing tools, but this thesis focuses on those that analyze large data sets to 
determine the probability that an individual will commit a crime. Because these 
predictions occur before any criminal activity is observed or reported, they rely on facts 
that are facially innocent—such as personal relationships15 or employment status16—that 
are nonetheless statistically associated with crime.17 Suspicion based on facially innocent 
activity is not a new concept. For decades, police have used crime “profiles” to justify 
investigative stops.18 For example, law enforcement agencies have developed a “drug 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Id. 
 
13 Id. 
 
14 For example, in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court recognized the need for “effective crime prevention 
and detection” when it created a category of law enforcement investigative stops, which fall short of full 
arrests, that fall outside of the usual Fourth Amendment warrant or probable cause requirement. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). In the 1990s, the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) introduced the 
Compstat system, which encompassed multiple data-driven methods of attempting to reduced crime. See 
generally VINCENT E. HENRY, THE COMPSTAT PARADIGM: MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN POLICING, 
BUSINESS AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR (2003); ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME: INNOVATIVE 
STRATEGIES IN POLICING 97-124 (1999). 
 
15 The Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) reportedly uses “social network analysis” to map individuals’ 
associations, especially within gangs, to create its predictions. Dokoupil, supra note 3. 
 
16 See Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., supra note 7 (providing a sample risk assessment form for parole 
candidates that includes employment status, among other factors). 
 
17 See Ferguson, supra note 6, at 309. 
 
18 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1989) (“Any one of these factors [provided by the police as 
justification for a stop] is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent 
travel. But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion. . . . Indeed, Terry [v. Ohio] itself 
involved ‘a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent’ if viewed separately, ‘but which taken together 
warranted further investigation.’ . . . ‘[i]n making a determination of [reasonable suspicion] the relevant 
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courier profile”—a list of characteristics and behaviors associated with people 
transporting narcotics—and routinely stop people in airports who appear to fit these 
profiles.19 The drug courier profile consists of behaviors such as being the first to deplane 
a flight, not checking baggage, and appearing sweaty—facially innocent behaviors that, 
taken together, may indicate a narcotics trafficker. This logic of associating innocent 
activity with criminal acitivity also underlies the predictive policing models discussed in 
this thesis. Thus, those predictive policing models can be described as “automated 
profiling” models.  
 Police have used automated profiling as a basis for initiating contact with 
individuals.20 In general, police contact ranges from consensual encounters, for which no 
suspicion is required under the Fourth Amendment;21 to investigative or “Terry” stops, 
which require reasonable and articulable suspicion;22 to arrests, which require probable 
cause.23 Traditional analog profiling generally results in investigative stops.24 In a typical 
profiling case, an officer on patrol observes behavior or characteristics that match a 
profile and stops the observed individual for questioning. Thus, the constitutionality of 
profiling has been analyzed primarily under the reasonable and articulable suspicion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
inquiry is not whether particular conduct is “innocent” or “guilty,” but the degree of suspicion that attaches 
to particular types of noncriminal acts.’”). 
19 See, e.g., Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Reid v. Georgia, 448 
U.S. 438 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996). 
 
20 See Dokoupil, supra note 3; Erica Goode, Sending the Police Before There’s a Crime, New York Times 
(Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html. 
 
21 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.8(c) (3d ed. 2014) (describing action short of 
a stop). 
 
22 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 
23 See generally id. 
 
24 See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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standard.25 This standard asks whether the totality of the circumstances led to an officer’s 
reasonable inference that “criminal activity [was] afoot.”26 Under this standard, the 
Supreme Court has given law enforcement broad leeway to use police-developed crime 
profiles as a basis for making investigative stops.27 
 However, automated profiling differs from analog profiling in significant ways.  
Automated profiling involves both human value judgments and computer learning in a 
continually evolving process of developing and fine-tuning profiles.28 First, programmers 
must write the underlying algorithm that will analyze datasets and make predictions.29 
These models are typically developed by private companies and licensed to police 
departments,30 so there may be significant variations in these algorithms from one 
company to the next.  Furthermore, the officers who use them may have little or no 
involvement in the development of the code and little control over or even knowledge of 
the underlying logic of the algorithms. Second, the models use computer learning to 
search for statistical associations and patterns in the data, which the models then use as 
rules to make future predictions.31 This means that automated profiles can develop and 
change over time without any human intervention. Third, in order to predict crimes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See id. 
26 Id. at 7–8. 
 
27 See generally Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The Gradual But 
Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L. J. 467 (1991). 
 
28 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Cal. L. Rev. __, 6–7 
(forthcoming 2016) (describing the process and objectives of data mining and the role that human value 
judgments play). 
 
29 Id. 
 
30 See, e.g., PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2015); HUNCHLAB, 
https://www.hunchlab.com/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2015). 
 
31 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 28, at 7–8 (describing “computer learning”). 
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earlier—before any activity32 is observed by a police officer—predictive algorithms are 
designed to find non-obvious connections between innocent facts and criminal activity. 33 
Algorithms are designed to find correlations that human police officers would not have 
found through their own common sense and experience. Finally, as in Chicago, 
automated predictions will likely lead to police intervention before any behavior—
innocent or criminal—is actually observed. Thus, automated profiling will increase the 
frequency of consensual police encounters, which fall outside of Fourth Amendment 
suspicion requirements. 
 These changes all have the potential to impact law enforcement accountability, 
transparency, and fairness. They also raise questions about whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies differently to criminal investigative techniques involving automated 
profiling and, if so, how. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the legal and policy 
challenges raised by predictive policing practices that involve automated profiling.  
Chapter I reviews the existing literature on law enforcement investigative profiling, 
automated decision-making systems, and predictive policing. Chapter I also presents the 
research questions this thesis will answer, the methodology it will use to answer those 
questions, and the limitations of this research. Chapter II analyzes how federal appellate 
courts have applied Fourth Amendment law to analog profiling. Chapter III discusses 
how these Fourth Amendment principles might apply to automated profiling and the new 
interpretational challenges that automated profiling will present for courts reviewing 
Fourth Amendment challenges to profile-based stops. Chapter IV moves away from legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Criminal or innocent. 
 
33 See generally, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, 
and Policing, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 15 (2016).	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analysis to discuss some of the limitations and public policy issues that should be 
considered before automated profiling models are adopted. Finally, Chapter V 
summarizes the findings of this research, suggests some policy guidelines for minimizing 
the potential harms associated with automated profiling, and proposes questions for 
further research. 
Literature Review 
 This thesis intersects two areas of scholarly interest: law enforcement criminal 
profiling and automated decision-making systems. Sections I and II review the relevant 
literature on these topics. Section III reviews the existing legal scholarship discussing 
predictive policing, which consists of only one in-depth analysis. This thesis builds on the 
small body of work around predictive policing and fills a gap in both the profiling and the 
automated decision-making literature by analyzing predictive policing as a form of 
automated profiling.  
Law Enforcement Criminal Profiling—The Drug Courier Profile 
 In the most basic sense, criminal profiling refers to the practice of investigating 
individuals for potential criminal activity based on generalized factors. This literature 
review focuses on formalized profiling practices—established law enforcement policies 
and practices that involve the explicit application of a pre-determined profile to 
individuals. Although predictive policing has the potential to involve more implicit or 
informal forms of profiling, such as racial profiling,34 the vast literature on racial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Later chapters of this thesis will discuss the potential for predictive policing to facilitate both intentional 
and unintentional racial profiling. 
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profiling is outside the scope of this literature review.35 In the analog world, the drug 
courier profile is the best known formalized profiling practice. The drug courier profile 
has received ample attention from scholars and courts.36 This is likely for two reasons: 
(1) drug courier profiling has been a commonplace law enforcement practice since at 
least the 1970s and has loomed large as part of a decades-long crackdown on illegal drug 
trafficking,37 and (2) the drug courier profile, unlike other law enforcement practices, is 
relatively transparent.38 The availability of information and jurisprudence around the drug 
courier profile makes it a helpful place to begin analyzing the Fourth Amendment 
implications of automated profiling. Thus, this literature review focuses on the 
scholarship discussing drug courier profiling.  
 The “drug courier profile” was developed in the 1970s by the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (“DEA”) to help identify commercial air passengers suspected of carrying illegal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For in-depth analyses and discussions of racial profiling, see, e.g., Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the 
Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); David A. Slansky, Traffic 
Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271 (1997); 
Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
956 (1999); Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1413 (2002); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998); David A. Harris, 
Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 
(1994); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983).  
  
36See Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and 
Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 480 (1990) 
(“[I]n terms of frequency of use by law enforcement officers and frequency of confrontation by appellate 
courts, [no profile] matches the drug courier profile.”).  
 
37 See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial 
Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B. U. L. Rev. 843, 847–48 (1985); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 561–62 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Few problems affecting the health and welfare of our 
population, particularly our young, cause greater concern than the escalating use of controlled substances. . 
. . the obstacles to detection of illegal conduct may be unmatched in any other area of law enforcement.”). 
 
38 Cloud, supra note 37, at 878–79. 
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narcotics.39 Typically, DEA agents and police officers observe arriving and departing 
airline passengers, watching for characteristics and behavioral traits that, “on the basis of 
[police officers’] collective experience, have tended to distinguish drug couriers from 
other passengers.”40 
When a specific traveler arouses the agents’ suspicions, 
[the agents] approach the suspect, identify themselves, ask 
the suspect to consent to questioning, and ask to see the 
suspect’s identification and ticket. If the agents’ suspicions 
are not eliminated during this exchange, they continue to 
question the suspect and ask him to move to another 
location within the airport, often a room used by law 
enforcement officers. The suspect is typically asked at this 
point to consent to a search of his person, luggage, or both. 
If the suspect voluntarily consents to the police requests at 
any stage of the transaction, the police are free to continue 
the investigation. If the suspect does not consent and 
attempts to depart, the police must either allow him to 
proceed on his way or seize him.41 
 
This literature review will address three common criticisms of the drug courier profile: 
(1) that its lack of uniformity makes it unreliable and gives police too much discretion;42 
(2) that it provides only generalized suspicion, rather than the individualized suspicion 
that the Fourth Amendment requires;43 and (3) that the judiciary abdicates its duty to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See Cloud, supra note 37, at 844; United States’ Petition for Cert. at 2–3 & n.1, Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544; United States v. Ehlebracht, 693 F.2d 333, 335 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (identifying DEA Special Agent 
Paul Markonni as the creator of the drug courier profile). 
 
40 United States’ Petition for Cert. at 3, Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544; see also Cloud, supra note 37, at 848. 
 
41 Cloud, supra note 37, at 848–49 (citing United States’ Petition for Cert. at 3, Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544; 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493–95 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 439 (1980); Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. at 547; United States Petition for Cert. at 12, Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544; United States v. Bailey, 
691 F.2d 1009, 1011–12 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1983); United States v. Van Lewis, 
409 F. Supp. 535, 538–39 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff’d 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1011 (1978); Brief for the United States 2–4, Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
 
42 See infra notes 50–57 and accompanying text. 
 
43 See infra notes 58–68 and accompanying text. 
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conduct individualized Fourth Amendment review when it accepts the profile as evidence 
of reasonable and articulable suspicion.44 
Validity and Accountability 
 
  The Supreme Court has neither explicitly accepted nor prohibited law 
enforcement’s use of the drug courier profile to justify brief investigative seizures.45 
Morgan Cloud’s 1985 article, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier 
Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, criticized the Court for deciding 
drug courier profile cases without delineating the specific characteristics that make up the 
profile or assessing its empirical validity.46 For an operational definition of the drug 
courier profile, Cloud pointed to the original profile created by DEA Special Agent Paul 
Markonni:  
The primary characteristics are: (1) arrival from or 
departure to an identified source city; (2) carrying little or 
no luggage, or large quantities of empty suitcases; (3) 
traveling by an unusual itinerary, such as a rapid 
turnaround time for a very lengthy airplane trip; (4) use of 
an alias; (5) carrying unusually large amounts of currency 
in the many thousands of dollars, usually on the suspect’s 
person, in briefcases or bags; (6) purchasing airline tickets 
with a large amount of small denomination currency; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 
45 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); see also Cloud, supra note 37, at 851 (citing Royer, 
460 U.S. at 512 (Brennan, J., concurring); Reid, 448 U.S. at 441; and Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 572 (White, 
J., dissenting), for the proposition that “[s]ome Justices [] have argued that the drug courier profile 
characteristics cannot provide reasonable suspicion”); id. (citing United States v. Harrison, 667 F.2d 1158, 
1161 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. $73,277, United States Currency, 710 F.2d 283, 290–91 (7th Cir. 
1983); and United States v. Ehlebracht, 693 F.2d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1982), for the proposition that “Other[] 
[judges] have concluded that while drug courier profile characteristics alone do not supply reasonable 
suspicion, they may when supplemented by additional suspicious facts”); id. (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 525 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42 (1st Cir.); and United States v. Forero-
Rincon, 626 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1980), for the proposition that “[a] third group [of judges] contends that the 
drug courier profile characteristics alone are sufficient”). Note that Cloud wrote this article before Sokolow 
was decided. 
 
46 Cloud, supra note 37, at 843–47; see also LaFave, supra note 36, at 481–82. 
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(7) unusual nervousness beyond that ordinarily exhibited 
by passengers. 
The secondary characteristics are: (1) the almost 
exclusive use of public transportation, particularly taxicabs, 
in departing from the airport; (2) immediately making a 
telephone call after deplaning; (3) leaving a false or 
fictitious callback telephone number with the airline; and 
(4) excessively frequent travel to source or distribution 
cities.47 
 
The other predominant profile, according to Cloud, was articulated in 
United States v. Ballard48: 
 
The eleven characteristics [of the Ballard profile] 
are (1) unusual nervousness; (2) no luggage or very limited 
luggage; (3) possession of an unusually large amount of 
cash, especially when in bills of small denominations; (4) 
unusual itinerary, such as taking circuitous routes from 
cities known to be source cities for narcotics; (5) arriving 
from a known narcotics source city; (6) paying for an 
airline ticket in currency of small denominations; (7) 
purchasing a one-way ticket; (8) use of an alias; (9) use of a 
false telephone number on an airline reservation; (10) 
placing a telephone call immediately upon arrival at the 
airport; and (11) travel by a known narcotics trafficker.49  
 
However, Cloud pointed out that the drug courier profile characteristics articulated by 
police officers often vary from case to case, making the profile “chameleon-like.”50  
The malleable nature of the drug courier profile has drawn criticism from several 
scholars and judges.51 They have argued that the profile’s malleability makes its accuracy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Cloud, supra note 37, at 871 (citing United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), 
cert denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980)). LaFave also points to the Elmore profile as the most commonly 
confronted profile. LaFave, supra note 36, at 480. 
 
48 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 
49 Cloud, supra note 37, at 872 (citing Ballard, 573 F.2d at 914). 
 
50 Id. 879. 
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impossible to verify52 and gives individual police officers too much discretion.53 
Christopher Slobogin has criticized the “post-hoc nature of the so-called ‘profiles’”—the 
fact that officers make them up after-the-fact to justify a seizure.54 However, Slobogin 
wrote that “if a profile is proven to show the requisite correlation with crime, and it is 
clear that the profile was actually used by the police in deciding to act, rather than made 
up afterward, then its use should not be prohibited.”55 Wayne R. LaFave has similarly 
cautioned that “[b]efore courts readily accept [drug courier profile] guideline[s], they are 
[] ‘obliged to require that the government provide satisfactory empirical evidence that the 
profile is valid and actually works.’”56 LaFave also noted that “the profiles do not 
predetermine just what combination of suspicious factors must exist for a lawful stop, an 
especially critical matter given that some of those factors . . . ‘describe a very large 
category of presumably innocent travelers.’”57  
Generalized Versus Individualized Suspicion 
 The drug courier profile led the Supreme Court to decide for the first time, in 
United States v. Sokolow,58 that police could stop an individual based on behavior or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See Id.; LaFave, supra note 36, at 482; David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A 
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L. J. 1059, 1077 (1999); United States v. 
Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Grant 
v. State, 461 A.2d 524, 526 (Md. App. 1983). 
 
52 See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 36, at 480–82. 
 
53 See, e.g., Id. at 482–83; Cole, supra note 51. 
 
54 Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 81 (1991). 
 
55 Id. at 82. 
 
56 LaFave, supra note 36, at 481–82 (quoting Cloud, supra note 37, at 873). 
 
57 Id. at 482–83 (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)). 
 
58 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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characteristics consistent with innocent conduct.59  Slobogin seemed to agree60 with the 
Sokolow majority’s dual justifications: (1) that this standard followed precedent, since the 
Court had previously upheld Terry stops based on conduct susceptible to an innocent 
explanation;61 and (2) that officers’ training and experience allow them to interpret 
conduct as indicative of crime although it may seem innocent to an untrained bystander.62 
Cloud, however, argued that the drug courier profile was different from other bases for 
suspicion; its general nature could not support individualized suspicion.63  Cloud argued 
that the drug courier profile raises “difficult Fourth Amendment issues” because it 
“describes innocent behaviors not linked to any specific crime. . . . compounded by the 
fact that these innocuous behaviors undoubtedly are exhibited by a large number of 
innocent travelers.”64 Cloud acknowledged that “the police sometimes are justified in 
relying upon ostensibly innocent conduct to justify searches and seizures,” but he argued 
that drug courier profile methodology “differs from previously accepted police 
practices”: “The profile does not identify conduct [that] is peculiar to a particular crime 
or suspect. Instead[,] it focuses on general patterns of behavior.”65 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (“Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any 
illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to 
reasonable suspicion.”). 
 
60 See Slobogin, supra note 54, at 84 (pointing out that the facts in Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523 (1967) were “as ‘innocent’ as those found in a drug courier profile”). 
 
61 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10. 
 
62 Id. at 10. 
 
63 Cloud, supra note 37, at 853. 
  
64 Id. at 852; see also Cole, supra note 51, at 1077 (“[T]he drug courier profile is said to be a compilation of 
police experience about who is more likely to be carrying drugs.”). 
  
65 Cloud, supra note 37, at 852. For example, peering into car windows is said to be susceptible to an 
innocent explanation but is also indicative of automobile theft.  But this behavior is directly related to the 
crime because it indicates an attempt to scope out automobiles for theft.  Cloud seemed to argue that drug 
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 Slobogin responded to Cloud’s criticism of the “generalized” nature of the drug 
courier profile.66 Slobogin argued that “a person targeted by a profile is being stopped for 
characteristics or actions specific to that individual, such as nervous appearance, choice 
of luggage, and choice of flights (factors which, taken together, happen to correlate at a 
particular level with being a drug courier).”67 He contended that Cloud’s argument, if 
carried to its logical conclusion, “would circumscribe many accepted types of police 
action. For instance, the suspicion underlying the detention of a person believed to be a 
potential criminal is often based on police experience with previous crimes under similar 
circumstances.”68 
Effect on Fourth Amendment Judicial Review 
 Cloud worried that the drug courier profile would fundamentally alter Fourth 
Amendment judicial review because judges would mechanically base their reasonable 
suspicion analyses upon whether the defendant’s behavior was matched to a drug courier 
profile. Cloud also contended that acceptance of the drug courier profile violated a “basic 
premise of  [Fourth Amendment] judicial review,” that “each case raising a Fourth 
Amendment issue must be judged on its own facts.”69 In Cloud’s view, the profile 
represents an unconstitutional “litmus-paper test,” developed by police officers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
courier profiles are made up of factors that aren’t directly related to the act of transporting illegal narcotics 
but that were merely observed in known drug traffickers. 
 
66 Slobogin, supra note 54, at 82–83. 
 
67 Id. at 83. 	  
68 Id. 
  
69 Cloud, supra note 37, at 856 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565 n.6 (1980)) 
(alterations omitted). 
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themselves, to determine whether police possessed sufficient facts to justify a seizure.70 
Cloud wrote that “[a]cceptance of a formula allegedly answering [F]ourth [A]mendment 
questions would radically alter the judiciary’s role. Judges would no longer engage in an 
independent review of the facts, but would be relegated to monitoring the use of 
investigative formulas by the police . . . .”71 Cloud pointed to several factors that would 
make this lack of judicial review problematic: the lack of scientific evidence validating 
the drug courier profile; the fact that the profile is used to evaluate complex human 
behaviors rather than simple scientific facts; and the fact that the profile is used to answer 
questions of constitutionality in felony cases where ultimate liberty issues are at stake.72 
Cloud concluded that “[t]he most rational judicial response to the profile would be to 
ignore it and rely instead upon the traditional methodology of the [F]ourth [A]mendment 
in deciding individual cases.”73 
Conclusion 
Many of the concerns scholars voiced about the drug courier profile apply to 
predictive policing to an even greater degree. Like drug courier profiles, the profiles used 
in predictive policing represent generalized observations about a class of known 
criminals.74 Unlike drug courier profiles, however, police officers would not be able to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Id. at 857. 
  
71 Id. 
  
72 Id. at 858. 
 
73 Id. at 920. 
 
74 These algorithms could be even more generalized than drug courier profiles because they cannot take 
into account a suspect’s real-world behavior during ongoing criminal activity, such as appearing nervous. 
Instead, they have to rely on information that police have about a person before any activity is observed. 
This concern may be compounded by the fact that algorithms are designed to look for non-obvious patterns. 
If the relationship between a facially innocent characteristic and a particular crime is not ascertainable by a 
police officer without using data mining tools, the connection is likely remote. In predictive policing, this 
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alter the predictive algorithm to fit a particular observation. This arguably makes 
predictive algorithms easier to empirically validate than more amorphous analog profiles. 
However, Cloud’s concerns about judicial review are eerily applicable. Scholars are 
already calling on courts to adopt reliability standards for predictive policing tools. If 
courts allow automated predictions to justify Fourth Amendment seizures, individualized 
Fourth Amendment inquiries could give way to mechanistic applications of 
predetermined technological75 standards.76  
Automated Decision Making 
 Predictive policing is just one of many applications of automated decision 
making.77 The government and private companies use predictive algorithms to determine 
who is creditworthy,78 who qualifies for social programs,79 what ads to display to Internet 
users,80 and whom to hire.81 This section will review the scholarship discussing legal and 
policy issues raised by automated decision making. Part A gives an overview of the basic 
concepts and terms underlying automated decision-making systems as well as some of 
the applications of automated decision making. Part B covers the common misconception 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
design is purposeful. A question for our courts and for the public is whether we want to allow police to stop 
and question individuals based on facially innocent factors that even a trained and experienced officer 
would not have associated with crime. 
 
75 As opposed to legal. 
 
76 Standards that, even if reviewed and approved by judges, will likely be set forth by law enforcement 
agencies or commercial industries. 
 
77 See, e.g., infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 
78 See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 
79 See, e.g., infra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 
80 See, e.g., Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 56 COMMS. OF THE ACM 44, 47–48 
(2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208240&download=yes (discussion of Google 
Adsense). 
 
81 See, e.g., infra notes 93, 96, 108–09 and accompanying text. 
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that data mining is neutral and discusses the ways in which this process can discriminate 
against certain classes. Finally, Part C addresses the lack of transparency of automated 
decision-making systems and the implications of this opacity on accountability and due 
process. 
Data Mining for Automated Decision Making: Definitions and Practices 
Automated decision-making systems are algorithms that analyze or “mine” large 
data sets, usually for the purpose of categorizing individuals (for example, as 
creditworthy or not creditworthy).82 Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst have aptly 
described how these systems work:  
In contrast to those traditional forms of data 
analysis that simply return records or summary statistics in 
response to a specific query, data mining attempts to 
locate statistical relationships in a dataset. In particular, it 
automates the process of discovering useful patterns, 
revealing regularities upon which subsequent decision-
making can rely. The accumulated set of discovered 
relationships is commonly called a “model,” and these 
models can be employed to automate the process of 
classifying entities and activities of interest, estimating the 
value of unobserved variables, or predicting future 
outcomes. . . . [This process] involve[s] attempts to 
determine the status or likely outcome of cases under 
consideration based solely on access to correlated data.83 
Data mining helps identify cases of spam and fraud and 
anticipate default and poor health by treating these states 
and outcomes as a function of some other set of observed 
characteristics. In particular, by exposing so-called 
“machine learning” algorithms to examples of the cases 
of interest[,] . . . the algorithm “learns” which related 
attributes or activities can serve as potential proxies for 
those qualities or outcomes of interest. In the machine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 28, at 7–8. 
 
83 Note again the similarities between automated decision making and analog criminal profiling. Both rely 
on correlations between observed characteristics (e.g., looking nervous) and unobserved or unobservable 
qualities (e.g., intent to commit a crime). 
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learning and data mining literature, these states or 
outcomes of interest are known as “target variables.”84 
 
The cases that algorithms use to “learn,” or to look for relationships in the data, are called 
“training data.”85 Barocas and Selbst pointed out that 
[b]y definition, data mining is always a form of 
statistical (and therefore seemingly rational) discrimination. 
Indeed, the very point of data mining is to provide a 
rational basis upon which to distinguish between 
individuals and to reliably confer to the individual the 
qualities possessed by those who seem statistically 
similar.86 
 
 Scholars have noted the increasing reliance on automated decision-making 
systems in the public and private sectors.87 Barocas and Selbst list three common 
applications: “fraud detection, credit scoring, and insurance pricing,”88 and their analysis 
focuses on automated decisions about whom to hire.89 Danielle Keats Citron’s article, 
Technological Due Process, analyzes the use of automated decision-making by federal 
agencies, which use these models to apply agency rules to individual cases.90 The models 
perform tasks such as “identify[ing] students eligible for free or reduced-price school 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Id. at 7–8; see COMMITTEE ON THE ANALYSIS OF MASSIVE DATA, ET AL., FRONTIERS IN MASSIVE DATA 
ANALYSIS 66–69 (2013), http://bigdatawg.nist.gov/FrontiersInMassiveDataAnalysisPrepub.pdf (emphasis 
added, bolded terms only). 	  
85 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 28, at 10. 
 
86 Id. at 7. 
 
87 See infra notes 88–93 and accompanying text. 
 
88 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 28, at 7. 
 
89 See id. at 9. 
 
90 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1263 (2008). 
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lunches”91 and “enroll[ing] eligible senior citizens into Medicare coverage.”92 In Keats’s 
and Frank Pasquale’s article, The Scored Society, they list the following examples of 
judgments made by predictive algorithms: 
Job candidates are ranked by what their online activities 
say about their creativity and leadership. Software 
engineers are assessed for their contributions to open 
source projects, with points awarded when others use their 
code. Individuals are assessed as likely to vote for a 
candidate based on their cable-usage patterns. Recently 
released prisoners are scored on their likelihood of 
recidivism.93 
 
The literature catalogs widespread use of predictive algorithms to make crucial decisions 
that significantly impact people’s lives. This phenomenon is ripe for analysis. 
The Myth of Neutrality and the Potential for Big Data Discrimination 
Barocas and Selbst devote much of their article to busting the myth that data 
mining is neutral.94 They catalog the ways in which bias can enter the data mining 
process and lead to discrimination. First, human subjectivity plays a role in designing the 
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92 Id. (citing STAN DORN & GENEVIEVE M. KENNEY, AUTOMATICALLY ENROLLING ELIGIBLE CHILDREN 
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93 Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 
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94 See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 28, at 1 (“Big data claims to be neutral. It isn’t.”). 
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algorithm.95 The target variable that the algorithm is supposed to determine (e.g., 
creditworthiness, good employee, likely recidivist criminal) must be operationalized as 
variables that algorithms can discern (e.g., good credit history, positive reviews on 
LinkedIn, low education level).96 “Through this necessarily subjective process of 
translation, [] data miners may unintentionally parse the problem and define the target 
variable in such a way that protected classes happen to be subject to systematically less 
favorable determinations.”97 Citron described the same problem in a different way.98 In 
the federal agency context, she wrote that “[c]omputer programmers inevitably engage in 
rulemaking” when they translate agency rules into code (which ultimately determines 
outcomes).99 However, this type of rulemaking happens without the notice and review 
required of traditional rulemaking.100 
Another way that bias can enter the automated decision-making process is 
through biased training data:  
[I]f data mining treats cases in which prejudice has played 
some role as valid examples from which to learn a 
decision-making rule, that rule may simply reproduce the 
prejudice involved in these earlier cases; and [] if data 
mining draws inferences from a biased data sample of the 
populations to which the inferences are expected to 
generalize, any decision that rests on these inferences may 
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systematically disadvantage those who are under- or over-
represented in the dataset. 101 
 
Kate Crawford offered a real-world example of this problem in her article, Think Again: 
Big Data.102 Crawford pointed to Street Bump, an application that detects and reports 
potholes in Boston by collecting data from residents’ smart phones as they drive through 
the city.103 Crawford warned that “whatever information the city receives from this 
application will be biased by the uneven distribution of smartphones across populations 
in different parts of the city.”104 This could result in underreporting, and potentially 
slower or fewer repairs, of road problems in poorer communities.105 
 Barocas and Selbst also warned of proxies for race and class that may be 
introduced into the algorithm.106 This happens when “criteria that are genuinely relevant 
in making rational and well-informed decisions also happen to serve as reliable proxies 
for class membership.”107 These proxies tend to reveal existing and historical inequalities. 
In Barocas and Selbst’s employment example, members of traditionally marginalized 
classes are more likely to lack the traditional markers associated with likely job success, 
such as education from an elite institution.108 Thus: 
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[E]mployers may find,  in conferring greater attention and 
opportunities to employees that they predict will prove 
most competent at some task, that they subject members of 
protected groups to consistently disadvantageous treatment 
because the criteria that determine the attractiveness of 
employees happen to be held at systematically lower rates 
by members of these groups. Decision-makers do not 
necessarily intend this disparate impact because they hold 
prejudicial beliefs; rather, their reasonable priorities as 
profit-seekers unintentionally recapitulate the inequality 
that happens to exist in society.109  
 
These potential entry points for discrimination may help explain the results of a 
2013 empirical study by Latanya Sweeney.110 Sweeney found that online searches for 
“black-sounding” names were more likely to yield ads suggesting that the person had an 
arrest record (e.g., reading “Latanya Farrell arrest record”) than were searches for “white-
sounding” names.111 These ads are generated by Google’s algorithm and are independent 
of any actual arrest records.112 The study could not definitively answer why this was 
happening, but it showed that the algorithm was reflecting a societal racial bias, even if it 
did not accurately predict whether the person searched had been arrested.113 
Transparency, Accountability, and Due Process 
Throughout the automated decision-making literature, one concern seems to rise 
above the rest: a lack of transparency.114 Citron and Pasquale warn that predictive 	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algorithms are “zealously guarded” and “shrouded in secrecy,” and therefore their 
decisions cannot be challenged.115 In the government agency context, Citron argued that 
this raises due process issues, since rulemaking and adjudications are performed 
automatically without the requisite notice and opportunity for review.116 Barocas and 
Selbst warned that algorithms may hide discrimination from even their own 
programmers.117 Bias and discrimination in automated systems are often unintentional 
and thus difficult to detect.118 When discrimination is intentional, Barocas and Selbst 
argued, it can be easily masked.119 Indeed, scholars’ reliance on hypothetical examples 
demonstrates a lack of public knowledge of the details of the predictive algorithms that 
determine our fates. Without adequate transparency, it is impossible to fully evaluate the 
effectiveness and shortcomings of automated decision-making systems. 
Conclusion 
Each of the concerns raised in the automated decision-making literature is 
relevant to the discussion of predictive policing models. While some authors mentioned 
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policing tools in police departments across the county. Very few legal scholars to date 
have specifically analyzed predictive policing practices. This scholarship will be 
discussed in the next section. 
Predictive Policing 
 Two legal scholars, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson120 and Elizabeth E. Joh,121 have 
written about predictive policing. Joh’s 2014 article, Policing By Numbers: Big Data and 
the Fourth Amendment, began to explore the interacting roles of artificial intelligence and 
human judgment in Fourth Amendment individualized suspicion.122 Joh’s analysis 
focused on predictions about the likely location of a future crime, and she concluded that 
“[w]hile likely not sufficient on its own to provide justification for a stop (because of its 
lack of specificity with regard to persons), such predictions could form the basis of police 
observation and corroboration.”123 She posited that courts are likely to accept automated 
predictions because the facts on which the predictions are based can be verified, making 
predictions arguably more objective than police officers’ inferences and thus “likely to be 
a highly persuasive factor in the reasonable suspicion formulation.”124 However, Joh 
cautioned that “no predictive policing program is entirely objective.”125 
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The basic building blocks of a predictive software program 
necessarily involve human discretion. The assumptions 
underlying any method of crime prediction rely upon the 
decision to choose one model of risk prediction over 
another. The data used to build the models will depend on 
discretionary judgments about the types of crimes used for 
prediction, and the type of information used to predict those 
crimes.126 
 
Joh also suggested that overreliance on probabilistic predictions might “nudge police 
judgments in favor of investigative detention in borderline cases because the police rely 
too heavily on probabilistic information.”127 
 In her 2016 article, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big 
Data, and Policing, Joh argued that predictive policing tools gave police new capabilities 
to identify and focus surveillance on certain areas or suspects.128 Joh labeled these 
decisions “surveillance discretion.”129 She argued that surveillance discretion has 
heretofore received little attention because “we assume that the police should possess 
such powers” and because surveillance discretion has been limited by the fact that 
investigations “typically only focus on a limited number of persons because of practical 
limitations imposed by resources and technology.”130 However, surveillance discretion 
capabilities will be expanded when “the ability to sort, score, and predict social activity 
will be an ordinary aspect of policing.”131 Joh suggested that we should rethink the lack 
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of legal limitations on acts of surveillance discretion that fall short of Fourth Amendment 
searches and seizures.132 
 Ferguson has written two articles on predictive policing and Fourth Amendmetn 
reasonable suspicion. The first, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, argued 
that automated predictions would likely be considered as part of the totality of the 
circumstances but would not be enough, standing alone, to satisfy reasonable 
suspicion.133 
The legal scholarship addressing predictive policing is scarce. It largely focuses 
on geographic prediction models—those that predict where and what type of crime is 
likely to occur, but not who is likely to commit a crime.134 The most cited work in this 
area is Andrew Guthrie Ferguson’s Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion.135 As 
the title suggests, Ferguson explored how predictive policing might impact the Fourth 
Amendment reasonable and articulable suspicion analysis.136  Ferguson’s analysis also 
was limited to geographic predictions. He began with the premise that all non-warrant 
police seizures involve some type of prediction: 
Police officers regularly take action in anticipation of 
criminal activity. Stakeouts, ongoing surveillance, and 
undercover investigations focus not only on past crimes, 
but also future crimes. On the street, a Terry stop based on 
reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot” 
is at base a prediction that the facts and circumstances 
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warrant the reasonable prediction that a crime is occurring 
or will occur.137 
 
Ferguson then sought to determine whether a prediction generated by an algorithm might 
be individualized enough to support a finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion 
sufficient to justify a Terry stop.138 In doing so, he analogized predictive policing to three 
existing lines of Fourth Amendment cases: tip cases, profile cases, and “high crime area” 
cases.139 
 Ferguson’s analysis of Fourth Amendment cases revealed that (1) “the 
information [(tip, profile, or high crime area)] alone is never enough to control the 
reasonable suspicion analysis;”  (2) “the predictive information must be particularized to 
a person, a profile, or a place, in a way that directly connects the suspected crime to the 
suspected person, profile, or place;” and (3) “the predictive value of the information 
declines over time, such that predictive information must be acted on quickly or be 
lost.”140 He concluded that “while insufficient on its own,” a prediction that a particular 
type of crime was likely to occur in a particular area, “if corroborated” by a potential 
suspect’s behavior (e.g., peering into car windows), “might result in reasonable 
suspicion.”141  
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 In 2015, Ferguson followed up with a second article on predictive policing and 
reasonable suspicion.142 In it, he argued that reasonable suspicion is a “small data” 
doctrine.143 Reasonable suspicion is generally based on the few discrete facts that a police 
officer knows and/or observes about a potential suspect.144 Ferguson noted that these 
pieces of information generally have not allowed police officers to learn the identity of 
the suspect before approaching him or her.145 According to Ferguson, “[t]he wrinkle of 
big data is that now officers are no longer dealing with ‘strangers.’”146 Because 
automated prediction-based reasonable suspicion will be based on data about an 
individual rather than on his or her actions, Ferguson argued that reasonable suspicion 
will more often be based on innocent facts about individuals.147 “Knowing who the 
suspect is and having more information (even innocent information) will allow the officer 
to meet the reasonable suspicion threshold more easily because the information will be 
sufficiently individualized and particularized.”148 
 Ferguson’s 2015 article argued for a big data solution to the Fourth Amendment 
challenges raised by big data and automated predictions.149  
If big data resources are used to tip the scales of reasonable 
suspicion in favor of law enforcement, then courts should 
require a higher level of detail and correlation using the 	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insights and capabilities of big data. . . . Big data can 
provide information about a person on a generalized or 
granular scale, and the latter should be required. The power 
of big data allows investigators to go deep into the data and 
make sure that the information is as tightly correlated as 
possible. In this way, a big data-suspicion standard will do 
what the reasonable suspicion requirement was always 
supposed to do—distinguish the criminal from the 
noncriminal in a manner that balances the need for 
effective law enforcement with a measure of personal 
liberty.150 
 
Conclusion 
 
The existing legal scholarship on predictive policing has accepted that automated 
predictions will soon factor into the reasonable suspicion analysis. Scholars agree that 
courts must understand the capabilities and limitations of big data and automation so that 
Fourth Amendment rights are not violated. This thesis builds on existing scholarship by 
offering an in-depth exploration of how courts might apply Fourth Amendment 
reasonable suspicion principles to automated predictions. Unlike previous scholarship, 
this thesis focuses on predictions that determine an individual’s likelihood of committing 
future crimes and analogizes this “automated profiling” to analog profiles such as the 
drug courier profile. This thesis also offers a much-needed discussion of the limits of 
these automated predictive models from a public policy perspective. Finally, this thesis 
offers a list of practical principles—in light of current and prospective uses of automated 
profiling—that law enforcement agencies, policymakers, and software developers should 
follow in order the minimize the potential harm of automated profiling to civil liberties. 
Research Questions and Methodology 
This thesis will address the following research questions: 	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1. What have courts said about if or when using profiles as a basis for 
investigative stops violates the Fourth Amendment? What limits have they 
set on these practices? 
2. What major problems does automated profiling present that the existing 
legal frameworks do not adequately address?  
3. What limitations and policy considerations should data scientists, law 
enforcement agencies, and policymakers consider before designing, 
implementing, and regulating automated profiling models?  
4. How can some of the problems identified in the answers to research 
questions two and three be addressed? 
 This thesis will review about 130 cases decided by the federal appellate courts 
that involve law enforcement’s reliance on predetermined crime profiles to make 
investigative stops. Cases for analysis were identified by searching Westlaw. In order to 
limit the cases to those involving investigative stops (a concept defined in Terry v. Ohio), 
the pool of possible cases was limited to those citing Terry. Thus, the case dates range 
from 1968 to the present. Relevant cases were then found by filtering these citing 
references for cases containing the word “profile” or “profiling” and cases decided at the 
Supreme Court or circuit court levels. Cases in this group that obviously did not deal with 
profiling (e.g., referred to a “high-profile” case) were eliminated. Approximately 130 
cases remained. Most of these cases involved some iteration of the “drug courier profile.”  
Limitations 
 This thesis has two major limitations. First, there is, as of now, no case law 
discussing predictive policing. Because the technology is new and has been implemented 
	   31	  
very recently, mostly in pilot programs, its use likely has not been challenged in court. 
For this reason, any legal analysis of predictive policing must attempt to draw analogies, 
in this case to profiling. 
 The most significant limitation for anyone writing about predictive policing is a 
lack of available information about the details of particular systems used by police. 
Neither private companies nor law enforcement agencies have released the details of how 
their algorithms work—what factors they associate with criminal activity, what databases 
they use, how they control for flawed data, etc. Thus, this analysis can only speculate 
about the functionality of these systems.
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CHAPTER 2: PROFILING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
 
Introduction 
Law enforcement in the last half-century has been marked by ever-increasing 
emphasis on “ferreting out” crime before it occurs.151 With this goal in mind, officers do 
not passively wait to observe criminal conduct but instead attempt to infer criminal 
activity from certain non-criminal observations.152 As law professor Andrew Guthrie 
Ferguson has pointed out, such inferences are essentially predictions.153 One such 
prediction is the “drug courier profile”—an “amalgam of characteristics” that is said to 	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the need to act quickly to foil imminent criminal activity . . . .”); see generally Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. 
Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423 (2004) (explaining how Terry’s progeny has 
continued to expand the police power to stop individuals when police reasonably suspect that crime is 
afoot); see also Alexander H. Kipperman, Note and Comment, Frisky Business: Mitigating Predictive 
Crime Software’s Facilitation of Unlawful Stop and Frisks, 24 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 215, 217–
220 (2014) (describing the development of CompStat in the 1990s, a sort of precursor to predictive policing 
software, as a way to use statistics and crime theories to attempt to predict and prevent crime). 
 
152 See id.; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1989) (“We said in Reid v. Georgia, ‘there could, 
of course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal 
activity was afoot.’ . . . We noted in Gates that ‘innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a 
showing of probable cause[]’ . . . . That principle applies equally well to the reasonable suspicion inquiry.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 
153 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 Emory L.J. 259, 262–63 
(2012) (“Many aspects of current Fourth Amendment law are implicitly based on prediction. Search 
warrants are predictions that contraband will be found in a particular location. Investigative detentions are 
predictions that the person is committing, or about to commit, a crime. Fourth Amendment concepts like 
probable cause, reasonable suspicion, informant tips, drug courier profiles, high crime areas and others are 
based on evaluating levels of probability that criminal activity will occur or is occurring.”). 
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indicate that a person is trafficking in illegal narcotics.154 Each profile characteristic 
standing alone could describe many “innocent travelers,” but police use the factors’ 
confluence to target suspects for further investigation.155 This practice of inferring crime 
from facially innocent facts underlies both analog and automated profiling. Thus, the 
jurisprudence around the drug courier profile is an apt place to begin exploring how 
courts might consider automated profiling under the Fourth Amendment. 
 This chapter discusses how federal appellate courts have analyzed the 
constitutionality of using predetermined crime profiles—particularly the drug courier 
profile156—in police investigations. The Fourth Amendment principles found in these 
cases provide clues to how courts may begin to assess the constitutionality of automated 
profiling. They also hint at the challenges courts will face when attempting to apply 
Fourth Amendment precedent to new digital policing techniques. These challenges will 
be addressed in Chapter III.  
 This chapter proceeds in three parts. Part A provides an overview of the drug 
courier profile’s origin, its use by law enforcement, and its acceptance in the courts. Part 
B analyzes the cases in which the drug courier profile has been relied upon as a basis or 
partial basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause. This part discusses the level of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 568 (1980). 
 
155 See generally, e.g., Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1. 
 
156 The drug courier profile is the most well-documented example of a predetermined set of characteristics 
or behaviors attributed to a particular type of criminal. See Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by 
Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth 
Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 480 (1990) (“[I]n terms of frequency of use by law 
enforcement officers and frequency of confrontation by appellate courts, [no profile] matches the drug 
courier profile.”). Cases involving the similarly predetermined “hijacker profile” were also surveyed for 
this thesis; but the hijacker profile, which was used to target potential hijackers in the 1970s and 1980s, has 
little bearing on this area of Fourth Amendment law now that the Transportation Safety Administration has 
broad authority to conduct airport searches. See Deborah L. Meyer, The Spot Program: Hello Racial 
Profiling, Goodbye Fourth Amendment, 10 U. MD. L.J. 289, 311–312 (2010).  
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particularity required for reasonable suspicion and the circumstances in which the profile 
does and does not meet those standards. It also discusses how courts evaluate law 
enforcement officers’ application of the profile under the Fourth Amendment requirement 
that each case be considered on its own specific facts. Part C acknowledges the freedom 
of law enforcement officers to use the profile as a basis for narrowing or focusing their 
investigations without implicating the Fourth Amendment. 
The Drug Courier Profile 
The drug courier profile was developed by DEA agents in the 1970s.157 It is an 
“amalgam of characteristics” 158 that, according to the DEA, “have tended to distinguish 
drug couriers from other [airline] passengers.”159 Although the factors that comprise the 
profile have varied somewhat from case to case,160 the profile generally includes 
characteristics such as arrival from or departure to an illegal drug “source city,” carrying 
very little luggage and/or no checked baggage, purchasing airline tickets with cash, 
appearing nervous, and traveling under an alias.161 In a typical case, agents approach 
individuals in airports who—based on the agents’ observations and prior knowledge—
“match” the profile. Agents ask the suspect to show identification and to answer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 See Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial Review 
of Investigative Formulas, 65 B. U. L. REV. 843, 844 (1985). 
 
158 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 568. 	  
159 United States’ Petition for Cert. at 3, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). The drug 
courier profile originated as a way to spot airline passengers who might be drug couriers, so most drug 
courier profile cases arise from airport stops, but the profile has been applied in other contexts, such as 
automobile stops, train station stops, and street stops. 
 
160 See Cloud, supra note 37, at 879; LaFave, supra note 36, at 482; David Cole, Discretion and 
Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L. J. 1059, 
1077 (1999); United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d, United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Grant v. State, 461 A.2d 524, 526 (Md. App. 1983). 
 
161 United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980). 
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questions in what is usually deemed a “consensual” encounter.162 “If the agents’ 
suspicions are not eliminated during this exchange,” they often move the suspect to 
another location and/or search the suspect’s bags, at which point the interaction typically 
matures into a Fourth Amendment seizure.163 When these seizures are challenged on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, the agents rely upon the matching profile characteristics, 
along with other observations or information they gained prior to the seizure, to justify 
the stop. While most drug courier profile cases involve airport stops, the profile’s use has 
expanded beyond airports. Police officers have cited drug courier profile characteristics 
to justify automobile164 and pedestrian165 stops as well. 
The Supreme Court has neither prohibited nor explicitly sanctioned the profile’s use 
as a basis for Terry stops. In United States v. Sokolow,166 the only Supreme Court case to 
directly address the profile, the Court held that the reasonable suspicion analysis is not 
affected by whether officers matched the suspect to a profile.167 Each case must be 
decided based upon the particular factors observed and testified to by the officer, 
regardless of whether those factors were part of a profile. Thus, analyzing the federal 
appellate courts’ assessment of the profile similarly requires a fact-specific, case-by-case 
analysis. 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Cloud, supra note 37, at 848–49. 
  
163 Id. 
  
164 See, e.g., United States v. Brugal, 185 F.3d 205, 208–09 (4th Cir. 1999), opinion vacated, 209 F.3d 353 
(4th Cir. 2000). 
 
165 See, e.g., United States v. Hawthorne, 982 F.2d 1186, 1187–88 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 
166 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 
167 Id. at 10. 
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The Drug Courier Profile and Reasonable Suspicion 
Drug courier profile cases usually arise from claims that seizures were not supported 
by reasonable suspicion. The Fourth Amendment requires brief investigative stops (Terry 
stops) to be supported by specific and articulable facts giving rise to the officer’s 
reasonable inference that “criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’”168 Courts evaluate the 
reasonableness of officers’ inferences based on “the totality of the circumstances—the 
whole picture.”169 The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he concept of reasonable 
suspicion . . . is not ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’”170 
When officers draw inferences based on the drug courier profile, courts must determine 
whether the profile factors relied upon, along with any other observations made by or 
facts known to the officer, were sufficiently particular to the suspect and could lead a 
reasonable officer to infer that the suspect was engaged or was about to be engaged in 
criminal activity.171 
The Particularity Requirement: A Fact-Specific Inquiry 
The only clear rule about when the drug courier profile can give rise to reasonable 
suspicion is that there is no rule.172 The chief criticism of the profile is that it lacks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Id. at 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). 
 
169 Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
 
170 Id. at 7 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). 
 
171 Id. at 7–10. 
 
172 See, e.g., Id. at 10 (“We do not agree with respondent that our analysis is somehow changed by the 
agents’ belief that his behavior was consistent with one of the DEA’s ‘drug courier profiles.’ A court sitting 
to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to 
that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a ‘profile’ does not somehow detract from 
their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained agent.”); United States v. Erwin, 803 F.2d 1505, 1510 
(9th Cir. 1986) (“There is no ‘litmus test’ for reasonable suspicion. Each instance of police conduct must be 
judged for reasonableness ‘in light of the particular circumstances.’ . . . The resemblance of facts to the 
profile does not determine the constitutional validity of a search.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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particularity because it is made up of characteristics that can describe “significant 
numbers of innocent persons.”173 However, the Supreme Court in Sokolow clarified that 
“innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for . . . reasonable suspicion.” Still, 
the Sokolow Court declined to adopt a rule either sanctioning or prohibiting the profile’s 
use as a basis for reasonable suspicion.174 Instead, it held that “[a] court sitting to 
determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the 
factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 
‘profile’ does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a 
trained agent.”175 The Court held that “[i]n making a determination of probable cause the 
relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree 
of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.”176 
When assessing particularity, courts ask whether the factors giving rise to 
suspicion, taken together, would sufficiently narrow the population of suspicious 
individuals, or whether they describe “a very large category of presumably innocent 
travelers.”177 At least three circuits—the Fourth,178 Fifth,179 and D.C.180 Circuits—have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 6 (1989); see also, e.g., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440–41 
(1980); United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1228–29 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gooding, 695 
F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 1982). 
 
174 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243–44, n.13 
(1983)). 
 
175 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). The Sokolow Court rejected the district court’s attempt 
to distinguish between facts describing “ongoing criminal activity” and facts describing “personal 
characteristics,” or “probabilistic evidence.” Id. at 6–10. 
 
176 Id. at 10. 
 
177 Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980). 
 
178 United States v. Matthews, 25 F.3d 1042, *4 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) (stating that the fact that 
a suspect matched the drug courier profile would have been enough to justify a Terry stop). But see United 
States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[W]e have specifically held that a drug courier profile, 
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interpreted Sokolow as indicating that profile factors, without more, can satisfy this 
particularity requirement. In Sokolow, six of the profile factors, taken together, were 
sufficient to justify reasonable suspicion. Agents seized Sokolow in the Honolulu airport 
based on the fact that (1) he paid for his plane tickets in cash; (2) he traveled under an 
alias; (3) his original destination was Miami, a “source city for illicit drugs;” (4) he had 
an unusually short stay in Miami; (5) he appeared nervous; and (6) he did not check any 
luggage.181 The Supreme Court held that, while “[a]ny one of these factors [was] not by 
itself proof of any illegal conduct and [was] quite consistent with innocent travel[,] . . . . 
taken together[,] they amount[ed] to reasonable suspicion.”182 Courts that take a profile-
acceptance view of Sokolow maintain that while “[s]mall parts of the drug courier profile 
may not always, standing alone, provide [] reasonable, articulable suspicion[,]”183 several 
profile factors taken together may justify a stop.184 
The Sixth,185 Seventh,186 and Eighth187 Circuits have maintained that the profile, 
without more, is too general to justify reasonable suspicion, and that it must be combined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
without more, does not create a reasonable and articulable suspicion.”). Note that Gooding was decided 
before Sokolow. 
179 United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461, 462–63 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544 (1980)) (holding that Mendenhall “implicitly approve[d] the use of the ‘drug courier profile’” as a 
basis for Terry stops). Mendenhall did not directly address the drug courier profile. 
 
180 United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 480–82 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (relying in part on Sokolow to find that a 
drug courier profile applied to Amtrack travelers sufficiently narrowed the number of travelers who came 
under suspcicion). 
 
181 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3 (1989). 
 
182 Id. at 9. 
 
183 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 139 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Alpert, 816 
F.2d 958, 960–61 (4th Cir. 1987)). 
 
184 See, e.g., Colyer, 878 F.2d at 480–82. 
 
185 See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 928 F.2d 405, *1 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished). 
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by other observations to give rise to a lawful Terry stop. At least half of the circuit 
courts188 have avoided ruling directly on whether the profile alone can justify a Terry 
stop. However, each circuit has found that some combination of the profile factors can 
justify a stop when accompanied by other observations, such as flight189 (the suspect flees 
when approached by authorities); inconsistent or untruthful answers during consensual 
questioning;190 an informant tip;191 a bulge under the suspect’s clothing (suggesting a 
weapon or drugs);192 or unusual conduct.193 Observations that alone would not support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 909 F.2d 1078, 1083 (7th Cir. 1990). 
187 See, e.g., United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 1990), abrogation rec’d by United 
States v. Gilbert, 936 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Poitier, 818 F.2d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 
1987) (“Although the Supreme Court recently recognized the evidentiary significance of factors that are set 
forth in a drug courier profile, it did not overrule the oft-cited principle . . . that these factors alone . . . 
cannot justify a Terry stop.”). 
 
188 The First, Second, Third, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 
 
189 See United States v. Rodriquez-Sanchez, 23 F.3d 1488, 1493 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Brugal, 
209 F.3d 353, 360–61 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 667 (6th Cir. 1977). 
 
190 See United States v. Hardison, 56 F.3d 78 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sterling, 909 F.2d 1078, 
1084 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Goodwin, 449 F.3d 766, 767–68 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 493–94 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Hernandez, 854 F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir. 
1988); United States v. Pino, 855 F.2d 357, 363 (6th Cir. 1988), amended, 866 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Allen, 842 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Poitier, 818 F.2d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 
1987). But see United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that a broad profile plus 
a suspect’s untruthful answer about his immigration status did not justify reasonable suspicion that the 
suspect was a drug courier because such reasoning “opens the door to allowing millions of undocumented 
immigrants to be detained for further questioning on that basis. To hold that one’s illegal presence in this 
country is a sign of anything more than an immigration violation stretches the Fourth Amendment much 
too far.”). 
 
191 United States v. Drinkard, 900 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. McMurray, 34 F.3d 1405, 
1410 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 718–19 (7th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Nelson, 42 F.3d 1403 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Zukas, 843 F.2d 179, 182–83 (5th Cir. 
1988). 
 
192 See United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 289–90 (6th Cir. 1988); Allen, 842 F.2d 1292; United States v.  
$84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 884–85 
(6th Cir. 1978). But see United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 1990) (abrogated as to 
whether a seizure occurred) (finding that the drug courier profile plus a visible bulge did not justify 
reasonable suspicion). 
 
193 See United States v. Alpert, 816 F.2d 958, 960–61 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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reasonable suspicion (such as a tip from an unreliable informant194 or refusal to cooperate 
with questioning195) have been bolstered by the profile. In United States v. Coggins,196 
agents stopped a suspected drug courier because he fit the profile and because his travel 
companions were “recognized individuals involved in illegal activities.”197 The Third 
Circuit held that while “[m]ere association with a known criminal cannot on its own be a 
basis for ‘reasonable suspicion[,] . . . . when such association is combined with other 
elements [all of which were profile factors] . . . a reasonable suspicion adequate to 
support an investigative detention may indeed arise.”198 Courts continue to disagree over 
whether the drug courier profile alone can justify reasonable suspicion, but Sokolow has 
held open the door for officers to use the profile as a substantial part of the basis for a 
Terry stop. 
Courts agree that no set of factors can justify reasonable suspicion if it would 
subject large numbers of innocent people to Terry stops.199 This is especially true if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 See United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 227 (1983)) (“[A]n uncorroborated tip from [] an [unreliable] informant cannot by itself furnish 
probable cause . . . .”); Id. (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985)) (“[A]n 
uncorroborated anonymous tip, even when it comes from law enforcement authorities, does not by itself 
justify a stop.”). 
 
195 Compare Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (“[R]efusal to cooperate, without more, does not 
furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”) with United States v. 
Goodwin, 449 F.3d 766, 767–68 (2006) (holding that the drug courier profile, combined with Goodwin’s 
refusal to let police search his bag, claiming he had misplaced the key to unlock the bag, justified 
reasonable suspicion). 
 
196 986 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
197 Coggins, 986 F.2d at 655. 
 
198 Id. 
 
199 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 6 (1989) (emphasizing that the factors justifying reasonable 
suspicion “did not describe ‘significant numbers of innocent persons’”); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 
441 (1980) (“[T]he evidence relied on . . . describe[s] a very large category of presumably innocent 
travelers, who would be subject to virtualy random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little 
foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure.”); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 
	   41	  
factors tend to correlate with one another even in innocent circumstances.200 The Seventh 
Circuit criticized201 a stop on these grounds in United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma.202 
Officers pulled over Ornelas-Ledesma because he was driving through California (a state 
considered a “source state” for drugs) in a 1981 two-door Oldsmobile (a vehicle believed 
to be one of “drug traffickers’ favorites”) with another person; he had checked into a 
motel very late at night with no existing reservation; and he was Hispanic.203 The court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
595–96 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e must not accept . . . [a] profile of suspicious behavior very likely to sweep 
many ordinary citizens into a generality of suspicious appearance merely on hunch.”); United States v. 
Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 F.3d 1117, 
1121 (9th Cir. 2002)) (“[A]n officer[] . . . may not base reasonable suspicion on ‘broad profiles which cast 
suspicion on entire categories of people without any individualized suspicion of the particular person to be 
stopped.’”); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Rodriguez, 
976 F.2d at 595–96) (“[W]e have rejected profiles that are ‘likely to sweep many ordinary citizens into a 
generality of suspicious appearance.’”); United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(“If the profile is overly general, it carries little weight . . . .”); United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 475 F.3d 
928, 935 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]o establish reasonable suspicion, an officer cannot rely solely on 
generalizations that, if accepted, would cast suspicion on large segments of the lawabiding [sic.] 
population.”); United States v. Hawthorne, 982 F.2d 1186, 1190 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the combined 
profile factors relied upon by agents “describe[d] a very broad category of predominantly innocent 
travelers”); United States v. Cotton, 928 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 
441 (1980) (holding that the facts known to and observed by officers “describe[d] a very large category of 
presumably innocent travelers who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to 
conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure”); United States v. Urrieta, 
520 F.3d 569, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)) (“Standard drug-
courier profiles [] are highly problematic because they often ‘describe a very large category of presumably 
innocent travelers, who could be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to concluded that as 
little foundation [as the profile] could justify a seizure.’” (emphasis in original)); United States v. 
Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089, 1094 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[Supreme Court precedent] does not preclude all reliance 
on courier profile characteristics; it simply indicates that the most general of those characteristics cannot be 
the sole support for a seizure without more particularized evidence of suspicious activity.”); United States 
v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 370 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the factors articulated by officers justified 
reasonable suspicion because they “eliminate[d] a substantial portion of innocent travelers”); United States 
v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that a profile was sufficiently particular when 
investigations based on the profile “would typically reveal no more than three suspicious reservations on a 
400-seat train”). 
 
200 See Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 716 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 
201 The stop was ultimately upheld only on the basis of a (false) hit in a criminal database which gave the 
officers reasonable cause to suspect the defendant of drug trafficking. Id. at 717–19. 
 
202 16 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 
203 Id. at 715–17. 
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dismissed these factors not only because each one was innocent but also because they 
were all “correlated rather than independent.”204 
[T]he confluence of these circumstances is pretty 
innocuous . . . especially since many of the circumstances 
are correlated . . . . Hispanics are disproportionately 
concentrated in California, and having on average lower 
incomes than non-Hispanic Americans are doubtless more 
likely than other Americans to drive two-door rather than 
four-door cars, older rather than newer cars, and American 
rather than foreign cars. They are more likely to drive than 
to fly and, we imagine, less likely to make reservations in 
advance at motels, since cheap motels don’t advertise much 
or have 800 numbers. Nothing is more common than for 
people taking long trips to drive until they’re tired and 
then—often at very odd hours—to check in at the nearest 
motel, of course without a reservation. And people who 
drive long distances late at night prefer to have someone 
with them. Because  “suspicious” circumstances . . . are so 
strongly correlated with each other, were they considered 
sufficient by themselves to justify a stop the practical 
consequences would be that a very large population of all 
Hispanic Americans would be vulnerable to being stopped 
on suspicion of drug trafficking. Hispanics would be 
second-class citizens in the eyes of the police.205 
 
Not all courts have found this prohibition of overly broad profiles to be incompatible with 
exclusive reliance on the drug courier profile. The Fourth206 and D.C.207 Circuits have 
accepted the profile as sufficient to justify reasonable suspicion on the grounds that the 
profile factors significantly narrowed the field of potential suspects. In United States v. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Id. at 717. 
 
205 Id. at 716–17. 
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  United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 370 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the factors articulated by 
officers justified reasonable suspicion because they “eliminate[d] a substantial portion of innocent 
travelers”). 	  207	  United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that a profile was sufficiently 
particular when investigations based on the profile “would typically reveal no more than three suspicious 
reservations on a 400-seat train”).	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Colyer,208 the D.C. Circuit held that a profile used to stop an Amtrak customer was 
sufficiently particular when an Amtrak agent testified that investigations based on the 
profile “would typically reveal no more than three suspicious reservations on a 400-seat 
train.”209 The quantitative specificity of Colyer is anomalous. Other courts simply found 
that the profile “did not describe ‘significant numbers of innocent persons.’”210 Or that it 
“eliminate[d] a substantial portion of innocent travelers.”211 
An officer’s training and experience can give extra weight to inferences based on 
profiles developed by law enforcement.212 The Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion 
standard allows officers to reasonably infer criminal conduct from facially innocent 
observations in light of the officers’ training and experience.213 In United States v. 
Price,214 the Second Circuit held that “it is appropriate for a court to take into account 
characteristics enumerated in the profile, which represents ‘a kind of institutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 878 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 
209 Colyer, 878 F.2d at 482. 
 
210 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 6. 
 
211 Brugal, 209 F.3d at 360. 	  
212 Colyer, 878 F.2d at 479 (giving weight to the fact that “rather than mechanically matching appellant’s 
[airline] reservation with a profile, [the agent] selected those manifests which, on the basis of his training 
and experience, appeared suspicious”); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting 
United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1979)) (“[I]t is appropriate for a court to take into account 
characteristics enumerated in the profile, which represents ‘a kind of institutional expertness’ derived from 
the cumulative experience of DEA surveillance teams.”). But see United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402, 
1408 (6th Cir. 1990) (expressing doubt about the officer’s ability to draw inferences based on profile 
factors when the officer “had little on-the-job experience with [the profile]”); United States v. Wilson, 953 
F.2d 116, 124 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1982)) 
(“[A]lthough trained law enforcement officers may be able to perceive suspicious conduct not visible to an 
untrained observer, ‘any such special meaning must be articulated to the courts and its reasonableness as a 
basis for seizure assessed independently of the police officers’ subjective assertions . . . .’”). 	  
213 See Sokolow at 9–10. 
 
214 599 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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expertness’ derived from the cumulative experience of DEA surveillance teams.”215 
However, a lack of training or familiarity with the profile can work against the officer 
applying it.216 In United States v. Taylor,217 the Sixth Circuit invalidated a stop in part 
because the court doubted the officer’s ability to make profile-based inferences when he 
had little training or experience with the profile.218 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has 
cautioned that any special meaning interpreted by officers “must be articulated to the 
courts.”219 Officers who are versed in the drug courier profile may infer special, 
articulable meaning from permutations of its factors, but they cannot prevail simply by 
invoking the profile. 
The Terry Stop Exigency Requirement 
All investigative stops must be justified by temporal exigency. Officers 
conducting Terry stops “must have reasonable suspicion [that] the individual [being 
stopped] has, or is about to have, committed a crime.220 The authority of law enforcement 
to make stops and searches without first obtaining warrants is rooted in the need to 
apprehend individuals before they can flee, endanger others, or otherwise break the 
law.221 Thus, conformance with a profile cannot justify an investigative stop if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Id. at 502. 
 
216 See United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402, 1408 (6th Cir. 1990) (expressing doubt about the officer’s 
ability to draw inferences based on profile factors when the officer “had little on-the-job experience with 
[the profile]”). 
 
217 917 F.2d 1402 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 
218 Id. at 1408. 
 
219 Gooding, 695 F.2d at 82; Wilson, 953 F.2d at 124. 
 
220 United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 934 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Brigoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)) (emphasis added). 
 
221 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) 
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observed factors do not tend to indicate that a person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime. In United States v. Mendez,222 the Ninth Circuit held that a tattoo 
indicating a certain gang affiliation could not justify a stop because, although it  
might arouse suspicion that [Mendez] was involved in 
criminal activity at some point in the past and might lead a 
reasonable officer to suspect that he may become involved 
in such activity at some point in the future, it does not 
support a reasonable inference ‘that criminal activity may 
be afoot’ at the time of the stop or that Mendez might 
commit any particular offense now or in the future.223 
 
The Seventh Circuit has upheld the drug courier profile, without more, as 
justification for a stop when police had an exigent need to interrupt a potential imminent 
drug deal.224 In United States v. Goodwin,225 police officers boarded a train in order to 
question a passenger who was flagged as fitting several drug courier profile 
characteristics—in particular, a last-minute one-way ticket purchased with cash.226 The 
court wrote that  
[i]f the defendant had bought his ticket a week in advance 
and the police had known then that he fit the profile of a 
drug courier, they could have arranged for Dusty (the 
sniffer dog) to be at Union Station when the train was 
scheduled to depart [thus avoiding the need to board the 
train]. But because the defendant bought his ticket only an 
hour before the scheduled departure, the police had until 
then no ground for suspicion. Their only options at that 
point were to risk causing the defendant to miss his train or 
abandon the investigation. To say that it was unreasonable 
for them to choose the former course of action would make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 467 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 
223 Id. at 1169 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)) (alterations in original). 
 
224 United States v. Goodwin, 449 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 
225 449 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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last-minute ticket purchases a foolproof way for drug 
couriers to frustrate profiling. 
 
Goodwin and Manzo-Jurado demonstrate that the reasonableness of suspicion derives not 
only from the soundness of officers’ inferences but also from the perceived exigency of 
the stop. However, there is little discussion of exigency in the drug courier profile cases, 
because the profile rests on an assumption that its factors indicate an imminent (if not 
already carried out) drug deal. 
The requirement for Fourth Amendment review on a case-by-case basis 
The use of a profile does not obviate each court’s requirement to engage in a fact-
specific reasonable suspicion analysis.227 As the Supreme Court has noted: “There is no 
‘litmus test’ for reasonable suspicion. Each instance of police conduct must be judged for 
reasonableness ‘in light of the particular circumstances.’”228 This standard precludes 
officers from relying on “mere rote citations of factors which were held, in some past 
situations, to have generated reasonable suspicion.”229 Thus, “the DEA drug courier 
profile has [] not received a blanket stamp of approval” because such a “stamp” would 
contravene Fourth Amendment review.230 The fact that a number of coinciding profile 
factors justified reasonable suspicion in one case does not mean that the same factors 
create reasonable suspicion in a different case.231 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 
228 United States v. Erwin, 803 F.2d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 
(1968)). 
 
229 United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 
230 United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1227–28 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 
231 See Rodriguez, 976 F.2d at 594 (“[W]e must be watchful for mere rote citations of factors which were 
held, in some past situations, to have generated reasonable suspicion, leading us to defer to the supervening 
wisdom of a case not now before us.”). Id. at 595–96 (“[W]e must not accept what has come to appear to be 
a prefabricated or recycled profile of suspicious behavior . . . . This is required by the [F]ourth 
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Despite the requirement of a fact-specific inquiry, courts give considerable 
deference to officers’ knowledge and experience, which allows officers to make 
inferences that would not be considered reasonable for a layperson.232 In United States v. 
Price,233 the Second Circuit upheld a Terry stop based on profile factors observed by an 
experienced DEA agent.234 The Court found it relevant that “[Agent] Whitmore ha[d] 
been with the DEA since its inception in 1973[,] . . . had been assigned to monitor flights 
[in the airport] for two years[, and] . . . . had participated on several occasions in stops of 
passengers who were in fact carrying heroin.”235 Although courts cannot simply accept 
the drug courier profile as a stand-in for reasonable inferences, even skeptical judges 
have acknowledged that there is some value in the profile as a distillation of DEA agents’ 
collective experience observing drug couriers.  The Price court articulated this balance:  
The reasonableness of a stop must ultimately be determined 
solely by the reviewing court, and that court cannot be 
bound by a profile developed by the law enforcement 
officers whose actions are being reviewed. However, it is 
appropriate for a court to take into account characteristics 
enumerated in the profile, which represents “a kind of 
institutional expertness” derived from the cumulative 
experience of DEA surveillance teams.236 
 
The Price court thus suggested that some deference is due not only to the experience of 
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[A]mendment. The opinions of this court have put the nomenclature of reasonable suspicion into the public 
domain. We must not allow ourselves to be seduced by the reassuring familiarity of its echo.”). 
232 See  Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 501 (2d Cir. 1979) (“The 
circumstances surrounding the stop . . . . ‘are to be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious 
police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.’”). 
 
233 599 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 
234 Id. at 501. 
 
235 Id. 
 
236 Price, 599 F.2d at 502 n. 10. 
	   48	  
“institutional expertness” of the DEA agents who developed the profile in the first 
place.237  
 When evaluating reasonable suspicion founded on a profile, courts require 
officers to testify to the specific profile characteristics giving rise to suspicion.238 The 
meaning of these factors to the officer in light of his or her training and experience must 
also be articulated.239 In United States v. Wilson,240 the Fourth Circuit did not find 
reasonable suspicion because the officer failed to articulate the “special meaning” of a 
bulge observed in Wilson’s pocket in conjunction with drug courier profile factors.241 
The court held that it could not find reasonable suspicion because it was unable to assess 
the officer’s inferences without testimony as to his reasoning.242 The Wilson court 
contrasted these facts with those in United States v. Aguilar,243 which were substantially 
similar except that the officer in Aguilar testified that he “had observed other passengers’ 
[sic] with bulges at the ankles and that on each occasion it turned out that the bulge was a 
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238 See United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 124 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Gooding, 695 
F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1982)) (“[A]lthough trained law enforcement officers may be able to perceive 
suspicious conduct not visible to an untrained observer, ‘any such specific meaning must be articulated to 
the courts and its reasonableness as a basis for seizure assessed independently of the police officers’ 
subjective assertions . . . .’”); see also United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 669–72 (2d Cir. 1972) (requiring 
agents to testify to the factors comprising a confidential “hijacker profile” but allowing them to bar the 
public and defendant (but not the defendant’s counsel) based upon “the compelling urgency of protecting 
the confidentiality of the profile which has been devised as a method to reduce the threat of hijacking”). 
239 United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 124 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 
78, 82 (4th Cir. 1982)) (“[A]lthough trained law enforcement officers may be able to perceive suspicious 
conduct not visible to an untrained observer, ‘any such specific meaning must be articulated to the courts 
and its reasonableness as a basis for seizure assessed independently of the police officers’ subjective 
assertions . . . .’”). 
 
240 953 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 
241 Id. at 124. 
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packet of illegal drugs.”244 Courts give considerable weight to officers’ interpretation of 
facially innocent profile factors, but innocent facts alone are insufficient if their “special 
meaning” cannot be articulated. 
 Even in the context of a profile, some courts have refused to consider individual 
characteristics that are too broad to be probative of criminal activity.245 In fact, the Ninth 
Circuit has held that profile factors whose probative value is too low to be reasonably 
relied upon must not be considered.246 In United States v. Montero-Camargo,247 the Ninth 
Circuit found that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Montero-Camargo but that 
“some of the factors on which the district court relied [were] not relevant . . . to the 
reasonable suspicion analysis.”248 The court found that Montero-Camargo’s Hispanic 
appearance was not reasonably probative of undocumented status, since a substantial 
number of innocent people shared that specific characteristic:249 
Where, as here, the majority (or any substantial number) of 
people share a specific characteristic[,] that characteristic is 
of little or no probative value in such a particularized and 
context-specific analysis. . . . The likelihood that in an area 
in which the majority—or even a substantial part—of the 
population is Hispanic, any given person of Hispanic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Wilson, 953 F.2d at 124 (quoting Aguilar, 825 F.2d at 41) (alterations in original). 
 
245 See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The agents’ observation that the group members 
appeared out of place at the football game has no relevance to establishing reasonable suspicion because 
nothing suggests such behavior indicates an individual’s illegal status in this country. Observations so 
ambiguous that they bear little relationship to any sort of criminality have low, if any, probity toward 
finding reasonable suspicion.”). 
  
246 Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1132 (“As we have previously held, factors that have such low probative 
value that no reasonable officer would have relied on them to make an investigative stop must be 
disregarded as a matter of law.”). 
 
247 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 
248 Id. at 1131. 
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ancestry is in fact an alien, let alone an illegal alien, is not 
high enough to make Hispanic appearance a relevant factor 
in the reasonable suspicion calculus.250 
 
The Fourth Circuit has similarly refused to give any weight to the fact that a suspect was 
traveling to or from a narcotics “source city” when this factor has appeared in 
conjunction with other drug courier profile factors.251 The Fourth Circuit in United States 
v. Carter252 wrote that “the idea of law enforcement authorities conducting investigations 
based on the air travel of a suspect is dubious at best, particularly when the destinations 
are in fairly reasonable proximity to one another.”253 However, these assertions are rare. 
Most courts have considered each factor and its relative probity in light of all of the 
circumstances. 
 Despite a strong jurisprudential abhorrence for “litmus test[s][,]”254 the Second 
Circuit may have left some room for a more objectively reliable profile to serve as a 
proxy for reasonable suspicion. In 1972, the Second Circuit decided United States v. 
Bell,255 one of many cases in that decade involving the Federal Aviation Administration’s 
airline “hijacker profile.”256 The FAA used the profile to screen passengers, based on 
their reservations, for further investigation.257 The Bell court held that the hijacker profile 	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  United States v. Erwin, 803 F.2d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 
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satisfied reasonable suspicion because it was “constructed based on scientific, 
sociological and psychological data” and could be “readily and objectively employed by 
[a] ticket seller without requiring any subjective interpolation.”258 Although the Bell court 
found that the agents did not rely on the profile alone, its analysis strayed from strict 
adherence to the Fourth Amendment requirement for an independent inquiry into the 
facts in each case.259 Bell may be anomalous, but its unequivocal deference to a data-
driven, empirically reliable profile is noteworthy, particularly in light of courts’ 
skepticism of the drug courier profile’s reliability, which will be addressed in the next 
subsection. 
Courts’ Skepticism Toward the Profile 
At least five circuit courts260 have expressed doubts about the reliability of the 
drug courier profile and about law enforcement officers’ objective application of the 
profile. Some simply find it unhelpful, calling it a “protean concept,”261 a “shopworn 
amalgam,”262 and “highly problematic”263 because it can describe “a very large category 
of presumably innocent travelers.”264 Others have expressed wariness at basing 
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reasonable suspicion on law enforcement officers’ application of a profile created by law 
enforcement.265  
Perhaps chief among these concerns is the profile’s “malleable” nature.266 In his 
dissenting opinion in Sokolow, Justice Thurgood Marshall criticized the profile’s 
“chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations.”267 The Sixth 
Circuit in United States v. Respress268 enumerated some of the profile’s inconsistencies 
from case to case: 
A quick survey of various cases involving drug courier 
profiles can easily establish how malleable the factors 
relied upon are. For instance, though Officer Jones says he 
found it suspicious that Respress had no carry-on luggage, 
in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 5, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 
1584, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), what the officer found 
suspicious is that the alleged courier did have carry-on 
luggage. Similarly, Jones found it suspicious that Respress 
was the second to last passenger to deplane, while the 
defendant in United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 
(6th Cir. 1982), created suspicion by being first to deplane. 
Additionally, the cases reveal quite a large number of “drug 
source cities,” though the source city in this case (Ontario, 
California) is not often mentioned.269 
 
The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez270 expressed similar skepticism toward the consistency 
with which the same profile factors were coinciding in multiple different cases: 
We note, initially, that this is not the first time Border 
Patrol agents have tendered a similar profile to this court as 
evidence of the existence of reasonable suspicion. In fact, 	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this profile is so familiar, down to the very verbiage chosen 
to describe the suspect, that an inquiring mind may wonder 
about the recurrence of such fortunate parallelism in the 
experiences of the arresting agents.271 
 
The Sixth Circuit has warned that the profile’s malleability makes it an attractive pretext 
for race-based stops.272 The Respress court wrote that “[w]hen courts give significant 
weight to an officer’s reliance on such [general] descriptions, it becomes easy for the 
profile to be used as a pretext for a relevant factor the officer does not wish to articulate, 
namely a suspect’s race.”273 
 Critics of the drug courier profile assert that it allows police officers too much 
discretion274 and that it is too “mechanistic”275—two criticisms that appear to contradict 
each other.276 Concerns about discretion stem from the profile’s breadth and 
malleability—the profile allows officers to stop individuals based on factors wholly 
capable of an innocent explanation; it is capable of “adapting to any particular set of 
observations”;277 and it does not “predetermine just what combination of suspicious 
factors must exist for a lawful stop.”278 This can lead to arbitrary stops.279 On the other 	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hand, some of the profile’s critics warn that it is too formulaic and should not override 
officers’ common sense. This view actually champions officer discretion, not in the form 
of arbitrary stops but in the form of more careful and nuanced deliberation.280 Justice 
Marshall wrote that  
law enforcement officer’s mechanistic application of a 
formula of personal and behavioral traits in deciding whom 
to detain can only dull the officer’s ability and 
determination to make sensitive and fact-specific inferences 
“in light of his experience,” particularly in ambiguous or 
borderline cases. Reflexive reliance on a profile of drug 
courier characteristics runs a far greater risk than does 
ordinary, case-by-case police work of subjecting the 
profile’s “chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular 
set of observations.”281 
 
Ultimately, courts generally agree that “[w]hile [the profile] may be helpful in some 
situations, it detracts from the proper test . . . : whether specific, articulable facts in this 
case, considered on the totality of the circumstances, indicate reasonable suspicion.”282  
The profile as an investigative tool 
With a few exceptions, courts have avoided holding that the drug courier profile alone 
can justify reasonable suspicion. For the most part, they haven’t been forced to make this 
decision. Law enforcement officers can often articulate observations or facts other than 
the profile that contributed to reasonable suspicion. In most cases, the profile serves as a 
screening mechanism, helping officers target certain individuals to watch more closely, to 
follow, or to consensually question, before the encounter becomes a Fourth Amendment 
stop. Courts agree that “[t]he profile is a lawful starting point for police 
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investigations.”283 For example, the First Circuit has described the profile as “designed to 
guide the focus of the agents’ observations,” adding that “only when the characteristics 
are combined in a suspicious manner, or lead the agents to observe independently 
suspicious conduct, is official intrusion warranted.”284 Police interactions that fall short of 
a seizure do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, and there are no Constitutional limits 
on what factors or information officers can rely on to focus their investigations.285 Thus, 
law enforcement can largely avoid Constitutional scrutiny by using, or appearing to use, 
profiles merely as a “starting point” to “focus” investigations.286 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed federal appellate jurisprudence of predetermined profiles—
particularly the drug courier profile—and their use in investigative stops. Several 
principals have emerged from this body of law: (1) There is no talismanic acceptance in 
the courts of the drug courier profile, or any other profile, as an indication of reasonable 
suspicion, and the establishment of such a “litmus test” would likely violate the courts’ 
responsibility to adjudicate each Fourth Amendment case on its own facts; (2) for a 	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profile to justify reasonable suspicion, it must sufficiently narrow the pool of potential 
suspects such that it would not cast general suspicion upon “a very large category of 
presumably innocent [individuals][]”287; (3) an officer’s training and experience can 
allow her to infer criminal activity from facially innocent factors, but a lack of experience 
with a profile or the inability to articulate these inferences can militate against 
reasonableness; (4) all Terry stops, profile-based or not, must be justified by some 
exigency; (5) courts are generally wary of the drug courier profile’s malleability, the lack 
of proof of its statistical reliability, its mechanistic application by police officers, and its 
tendency to give officers too much discretion as to whom to stop; and (6) the profile’s use 
as an investigative “starting point” may obviate Fourth Amendment scrutiny altogether. 
The following chapter will discuss how these principals apply to automated profiling 
tools and practice.
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CHAPTER 3: AUTOMATED PROFILING
Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed how federal appellate courts have treated analog 
profiles—in particular the drug courier profile—when they are used to justify 
investigative stops. The Fourth-Amendment constitutionality of a profile-based 
investigative stop generally depends upon three considerations: (1) the specific profile 
factors relied upon to justify reasonable suspicion; (2) the role and robustness of the 
officer’s experience and knowledge; and (3) the ability of the applied profile to narrow 
the pool of “suspicious” individuals. Moreover, exigency is a prerequisite for any 
warrantless Fourth Amendment seizure.  
As discussed in Chapter I, automated profiling can be analogized to analog 
profiles, such as the drug courier profile. Both automated and analog profiles rely on 
observed relationships between facially innocent characteristics and criminal conduct. A 
predictive algorithm essentially creates a profile made up of factors that it thinks are 
statistically associated with crime. The more risk factors an individual has, the better she 
fits this profile, and the more likely she is to receive a high threat score. However,  the 
automated nature of automated profiling makes it unlike any investigative practice that 
courts have considered under the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion standard. 
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Predictive policing algorithms—including automated profiles—“mine . . . huge 
amounts of [data] . . . in ways that the human brain cannot.”288 Instead of relying on 
police commanders or analysts to interpret data and decipher trends, automated profiling 
uses “machine learning.”289 Machine learning allows computers to analyze big data sets 
for patterns and relationships, and to use those patterns as rules for making predictions.290 
Thus, predictive policing algorithms are programmed to make their own judgments about 
how to analyze data and what factors to focus on when predicting future crime.291 The 
introduction of machine learning and automation into the investigative process will 
complicate the reasonable suspicion analysis courts have applied to analog profiling. This 
chapter will analyze the ways in which automation will present new challenges to courts 
attempting to conduct reasonable suspicion analyses.  
This chapter proceeds in four sections. Section A will address how automation 
might confound inquiries into the specific factors underlying the decision to stop an 
individual. Section B will address the role (or lack thereof) of the officer’s experience 
and knowledge in making an automated prediction-based stop. Section C will discuss the 
ability of automated profiles to narrow the pool of suspicious individuals and to avoid 
subjecting large numbers of innocent individuals to arbitrary seizures. Finally, section D 	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will discuss the use of automated profiling in police actions that do not fall under the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections. Section D will also discuss exigency issues that might 
arise with the use of automated profiling. 
Automated Predictions and the Fact-Specific Reasonable Suspicion Inquiry 
Courts are unlikely to give “a blanket stamp of approval” to the use of automated 
predictions as justifications for Terry stops.292 Under the Fourth Amendment, courts are 
required to engage in a fact-specific reasonable suspicion analysis in each case.293 The 
Supreme Court held in Terry that “[t]here is no ‘litmus test’ for reasonable suspicion.”294 
The reviewing court “cannot be bound by a profile.”295 This standard has precluded 
courts from giving talismanic significance to the drug courier profile,296 and there is no 
precedent suggesting that automated predictions would be evaluated differently. Instead, 
police officers relying on automated predictions to perform investigative seizures would 
likely be required to testify to the individual factors considered in making the prediction. 
Testifying to the reasoning of a machine-learning algorithm might be challenging 
for police officers. The automated nature of automated predictions de-emphasizes the 
police officer’s experience, knowledge, and observations—the crux of traditional Fourth 
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Amendment reasonable suspicion inquiry.297 Predictive policing algorithms use machine 
learning to process large data sets “in ways that the human brain cannot.”298 The 
algorithms are typically created by private companies and sold to police departments, and 
the data they process can come from any number of sources.299 Thus, the police officer 
who sees and acts upon an automated prediction will not necessarily know each 
underlying fact that led the computer to infer that an individual was likely to commit a 
crime. A mere showing that the predictive software is reliable and accurate cannot satisfy 
the reasonableness inquiry. Since the prediction is based on underlying facts, the Fourth 
Amendment inquiry currently requires that the officer testify to those facts.  
Moreover, it may not be enough simply to recite the factors that a predictive 
model generally considers. Such a recitation would not necessarily represent the factors 
that weighed into a particular prediction. For example, police in Morris County, New 
Jersey, used five variables to geographically predict burglaries: (1) “past burglaries”; (2) 
“the residential location of individuals arrested for theft of burglary between 2009 and 
2011”; (3) “the proximity to major highways”; (4) “the geographic concentration of 
males between the ages of 16 and 24”; and (5) “the location of apartment complexes and 
hotels.”300 However, a prediction based on this risk model would not necessarily indicate 
that every factor on this list was present. In the drug courier profile context, courts have 
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held that some factors or combinations of factors constituting part of a profile were too 
general to justify reasonable suspicion.301 Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion 
jurisprudence suggests that officers must testify to the specific factors bearing on each 
individual prediction. At the very least, courts should ask whether the predictive model at 
issue required a certain number of the factors to be present before labeling an individual 
as at-risk of committing a crime. 
The requirement for officer testimony may conflict with police departments’ and 
software companies’ desire to maintain the secrecy of proprietary algorithms. However, 
there is precedent for allowing officers to exclude the public and opposing parties from 
hearing this testimony. In United States v. Bell,302 the Second Circuit allowed police 
officers to testify to the “hijacker profile” in a closed courtroom, “limited to counsel.”303 
The court found it “not only highly desirable but essential, if the profile system is to 
continue, that [the hijacker profile] be kept confidential.”304 Similar allowances are 
plausible in the automated profiling context. The policy implications of this secrecy will 
be addressed in Chapter Four. 
Automated Inferences and the Role of the Officer’s Experience 
The current reasonable-suspicion inquiry focuses on the experience and 
knowledge of the police officer.305 Courts ask what facts the officer knew or observed at 
the time of the seizure and how the officer’s training and experience informed her 
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inferences.306 This inquiry is at odds with automated predictions. Automated predictions 
are based on facts known to a computer, and the knowledge the computer has “learned” 
from all of the data it has processed.307 The point of using automated decision-making 
systems is that they can “learn” and process more information more efficiently than a 
human police officer.308 This raises questions about how, if at all, a police officer’s 
experience and training should factor into a reasonable suspicion analysis arising from an 
automated prediction. When an officer takes some action based on a computer’s 
probabilistic prediction, is the officer making an inference, or is the officer simply 
responding to a computer’s inference? 
The use of automated predictions involves at least some measure of substituting a 
computer’s judgment for the officer’s judgment. The doctrine of reasonable suspicion 
rests on the assumption that officers must make quick but reasonable decisions based 
upon what they observe, what they know, and what their past experience tells them about 
a situation. But what happens when a computer purports to know something the officer 
doesn’t? Under Fourth Amendment review of investigative seizures, an officer is not 
entitled to inferences that she cannot articulate.309 If courts are to apply this principle to 
inferences made by a computer, then someone (if not the officer, then perhaps a technical 
expert) must be able to articulate the facts and reasoning underlying the prediction—and 	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language.” Richard E. Myers II, Challenges to Terry for the Twenty-First Century, 81 MISS. L. J. 937, 938–
47 (2012) (“[M]any . . . police officers[] may lack the linguistic capacity to successfully recount their 
experiences in language that lawyers and judges can use in court.”). 
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justifying the officer’s reliance on it—in a way that judges who are not technical experts 
can understand. Even if such testimony is feasible, there is likely to be some discrepancy 
between what the computer “knows” and what the officer knows at the time of the 
seizure. This discrepancy could bear on the officer’s ability to judge whether the 
particular circumstances warranted a seizure. 
Courts will likely consider the officer’s training and experience with the 
prediction software. In the drug courier profile cases, courts were more likely to defer to 
officers’ inferences drawn from the drug courier profile when the officers were 
knowledgeable about and experienced with applying the profile.310 Courts may 
foreseeably emphasize the officer’s knowledge about the reliability of the predictive 
software. For example, if an officer receives a prediction that an individual has an 80 
percent likelihood of committing a crime, and the officer has knowledge or reason to 
believe that the predictive software has a very high reliability and accuracy level, courts 
may be more likely to defer to that officer’s decision to stop the individual than if the 
officer had no knowledge of the software’s reliability. Similarly, courts may be more 
likely to defer to officers who have had extensive experience using the software and who 
testify that, nine times out of ten, when they make stops based on the software’s 
predictions, they find evidence of illegal activity. However, establishing sound metrics of 
automated predictive software’s reliability and accuracy could take years of pilot testing 
and record keeping. In the mean time, since pilot testing involves the rights of real 
people, police action based on automated predictions is likely to come before a court.311 
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311 See Ferguson (2012), supra note 120, at 312. 
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Courts will have to grapple with how automated inferences, based on ones and zeros, will 
fit into what has heretofore been a highly context-dependent inquiry.  
Automation, Officer Discretion, and Preventing Arbitrary Seizures 
Courts may see the formulaic and automated nature of predictive software as a 
strength or a weakness—or possibly both. In his Sokolow dissent, Justice Marshall 
warned that a “law enforcement officer’s mechanistic application of a formula of 
personal and behavioral traits in deciding whom to detain can only dull the officer’s 
ability and determination to make sensitive and fact-specific inferences[.]”312 Courts 
upholding profile-based stops have emphasized the ways in which officers avoided 
“mechanically matching” the suspect with a profile and instead relied on their “training 
and experience” to decide whether the observed facts “appeared suspicious.”313 An 
automated profile is necessarily even more “mechanistic” than an analog one. A 
computer makes predictions based on the same algorithm—the same pre-determined set 
of risk factors—applied to every potential suspect. These factors can change over time, 
but only in response to new data processed and new information learned by the 
computer—not in response to what the officer observes or learns. Officers will 
presumably have to exercise discretion by deciding how heavily to weigh and ultimately 
whether to act on the prediction, based on the system’s reliability, the other 
circumstances at issue, and the officer’s experience. Still, any decision that takes the 
automated prediction into account relies at least in part on a mechanistic application of a 
pre-determined profile. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 
313 United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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Critics of the drug courier profile—often the same ones who warn of overly 
mechanistic application—condemn its “chameleon-like” “malleability.”314 Courts have 
complained of the variable and even contradictory nature of the profile’s factors from 
case to case.315 Critics argue that officers’ ability to tweak the profile factors to fit a given 
situation gives them too much leeway to create an after-the-fact justification for searches 
that were otherwise based on “mere hunches.”316 An automated profile would appear to 
solve this problem by disallowing officers from tweaking the risk factors to fit a given 
situation. The Second Circuit’s treatment of the 1970s-era “highjacker profile” suggests 
that courts might give more deference to “objectively employed” profiles compiled based 
on “scientific, sociological[,] and psychological data[.]”317 However, this deference to 
“objective” markers of suspicion applied “without [] any subjective interpolation”318 is 
anomalous in Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion law. Jurisprudence in this area 
almost always prizes officers’ reasonable inferences above all else.319  Thus, giving 
weight to the purported objectivity of automated predictions would significantly change 
the nature of the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion inquiry. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 124 (4th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Respress, 9 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 
592, 595 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Jennings, 985 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1993); LaFave, supra note 36, at 
482. 
 
315 See Respress, 9 F.3d at 490. 
 
316 See Cloud, supra note 37, at 858; LaFave, supra note 36, at 482. 
 
317 See United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 669–70 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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319 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696–97 (1996); see generally Colin D. Wood, They 
Didn’t Look Right to Me!: Reasonable Suspicion in Kansas: Through Whose Eyes Is It Viewed?, 76 J. KAN. 
B.A. 16 (2007). This emphasis on officers’ subjective inferences is often criticized, see, e.g., Dana 
Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth Amendment, 17 TEX. J. 
WOMEN & L. 153, 172–82 (2008);  Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime 
Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable 
Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1607–15 (2008), but it remains the prevailing standard. 
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Both of these criticisms of drug courier profiles stem from courts’ longstanding 
skepticism of uncabined officer discretion leading to arbitrary searches and seizures.320 
Courts must ask whether the use of automated predictions upholds the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment to guard against arbitrary law enforcement action.321 Some 
proponents of predictive policing would argue that automated predictions represent hard 
statistical probabilities, which can eliminate arbitrariness from and increase the 
objectivity of officers’ decisions.322 But courts would abdicate their responsibilities if 
they simply accepted this reasoning, or required only a showing that a predictive system 
and its underlying data were statistically reliable. 
In the reasonable suspicion context, the Fourth Amendment protects against 
arbitrary seizures by requiring officers to testify to the “totality of the circumstances,” 
including observed or previously known facts sufficient to give rise to suspicion.323 
Predictive algorithms are incapable of knowing or observing the “totality of the 
circumstances.” They can only make inferences based on the statistical relationships they 
find in the data they have. The probativeness of these relationships may vary from one 
instance to another based on the totality of the circumstances. In one person, multiple risk 
factors associated with crime may be correlated with one another for innocent reasons—
as was the case in United States v. Ornelas Ledesma, where the court found that Hispanic 
Americans were more likely to fit an iteration of the drug courier profile based on their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1968); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984). 
 
321 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12–13; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215. 
 
322 See, e.g., Michael Thomsen, Predictive Policing and the Fantasy of Declining Violence in America, 
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323 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989). 
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likelihood of being poor and transient rather than their likelihood of being criminals.324 In 
another person, the same risk factors may be independent and highly probative of 
criminal activity. Officers are ultimately and unavoidably responsible for  determining 
how much weight to give to an automated prediction in light of the surrounding 
circumstances. Thus, the Fourth Amendment requires courts to evaluate the interplay 
between the prediction—including its underlying analysis—and the officer’s knowledge 
and judgment. 
Ultimately, the reasonableness of a profile depends not on its rigidness or 
malleability but on its ability to sufficiently narrow the specter of suspicion. Profiles are 
unconstitutionally broad if they would subject “significant numbers of innocent persons” 
to “virtually random seizures.”325 Officers, and ultimately courts, must determine whether 
automated profiles sufficiently limit the number of potential suspects who fit them. This 
is where the statistical nature of automated profiles may help by making it feasible to 
determine the percentage of the population that fits a particular profile.326 The task of 
determining narrowness may be better facilitated by some systems than by others. For 
example, a system that predicts a person’s likelihood of committing a crime as a 
percentage may help officers eliminate large numbers of innocent persons from 
suspicion. Officers could adopt a policy of requiring a very high likelihood (say 80% or 
higher) before taking the prediction seriously. On the other hand, systems such as Beware 
that attempt to categorize all individuals into three broad risk categories (red, yellow, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 716–17 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 
325 Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980). 
 
326 In United States v. Colyer, the D.C. Circuit held that a profile used to stop an Amtrak customer was 
sufficiently narrow when an Amtrak agent testified that investigations based on the profile “would typically 
reveal no more than three suspicious reservations on a 400-seat train.” United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 
469, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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green) may be less easily parsed and more susceptible to sweeping in large numbers of 
people. 
Consensual Encounters and “Surveillance Discretion” 
Although this analysis has focused on Fourth Amendment seizures, automated 
profiling is perhaps more likely to lead to law enforcement interventions that do not fall 
under the Fourth Amendment’s protections.327  Chicago’s Custom Notifications program, 
for example, directs officers to visit at-risk individuals’ homes and inform them of the 
consequences of committing violent crimes.328 Such “knock-and-talks” are considered 
consensual encounters and do not fall under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause requirements.329 Police need not have any particular level of 
suspicion or justification for simply approaching an individual—at her residence or in 
public—and asking questions. Thus, law enforcement can use automated profiling as a 
“starting point” for investigations without triggering Fourth Amendment protections. Law 
Professor Elizabeth Joh has referred to law enforcement decisions “to focus police 
attention on a particular person” as “surveillance discretion.”330  There are few if any 
legal limits on surveillance discretion.331 However, arrests often develop from consensual 
encounters when questioning yields information that gives police probable cause.332 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (delineating Fourth Amendment seizures from police 
conduct that falls short of a seizure and does not fall under Fourth Amendment protection). 
 
328 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 
329 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013). 
 
330 Joh, Surveillance Discretion, supra note 121, at 15, 17. 
 
331 See id. 
 
332 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“[A]n 
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these situations, courts should pay close attention to the extent to which automated 
predictions factored into the decision to approach and ultimately arrest an individual. 
 Automated predictive software is designed to aid in the early prevention of crime, 
lending itself more to non-Fourth Amendment interventions than to Terry stops, which 
require temporal exigency.333 Algorithms predict what is likely to happen at some point 
in the future, but they do not necessarily indicate that someone is in the middle of 
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. Thus, automated predictions 
can more aptly assist with law enforcement efforts to seek out an individual and conduct 
a “consensual” intervention rather than with Terry stops, which are associated with 
chance encounters—when police officers happen to observe individuals acting 
suspiciously. The potential social and policy implications of these prediction-based 
“consensual” encounters will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has drawn seven important inferences about how courts might apply 
Fourth Amendment law to automated profiling predictions. First, the Fourth Amendment 
requires courts to judge reasonable suspicion based on the individualized facts in each 
case, and this standard likely precludes courts from giving “blanket” or binding approval 
to the use of automated predictions to justify seizures. Second, officers relying on 
automated predictions will have to make some showing as to the specific factors and 
rationales underlying the automated prediction, but the information may be allowed to 
remain under seal. Third, incorporating automated predictions into the reasonable 
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333 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
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suspicion calculus will necessarily shift the focus of the inquiry away from the officer’s 
experience, knowledge, observations, and inferences. Courts must grapple with 
discrepancies between the officer’s knowledge and the computer’s “knowledge.” Fourth, 
officers’ knowledge of and experience with the automated prediction software at issue 
will likely be an important factor in the determination of whether the officer acted 
reasonably. Fifth, courts must ensure that the deployment of automated predictions does 
not lead to arbitrary seizures by, for example, giving undue weight to certain 
characteristics that may not be particularly probative of crime. Sixth, courts must also 
ensure that automated prediction software is used in a way that allows officers to use 
their discretion to judge the reliability and appropriateness of predictions in light of the 
totality of the circumstances. Finally, it is possible for automated profiling to avoid 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny altogether by operating in the background to guide 
“surveillance discretion.” The next chapter will discuss some of the potential social and 
policy implications of automated profiling.
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CHAPTER 4: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AUTOMATED PROFILING
Introduction 
So far, this thesis has analyzed how Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion law 
might apply to automated profiling. However, the legality of automated profiling should 
not be the only question police departments and governments consider before 
implementing this technology into policing practices. Automated predictive models come 
with a particular set of limitations and risks that should be acknowledged in any policy 
decisions to implement and regulate the use of such models. The purpose of this chapter 
is to discuss these considerations. 
This chapter proceeds in seven sections. The first four sections discuss specific 
aspects of automated predictive software and its implementation that should be addressed 
by the data scientists who design predictive software, the law enforcement agencies that 
implement it, and the policymakers that regulate it. Section A discusses the relevance of 
the underlying factors that automated prediction software might consider when making 
predictions. Section B discusses reliability issues that can arise when computers use big 
data to predict crime. Section C discusses the ways in which bias can enter the automated 
decision-making process and lead to disparate treatment of minority groups. Section D 
discusses the importance and the challenge of maintaining government transparency 
when using automated predictive policing software.  
The final three sections address broader concerns about the philosophy and 
objectives underlying the adoption of automated profiling tools. Section E discusses the 
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modern trend of numbers-based policing and its capacity to skew police priorities away 
from protecting the holistic well-being of communities. Section F discusses the 
phenomenon of system avoidance and the ways in which automated profiling might 
exacerbate system avoidance. Finally, Section G contemplates a right to be unpredictable, 
a liberty interest based on the social value of autonomy that may be threatened by 
overreliance on predictive policing. 
Relevance334 
Predictive analytics identify connections and patterns, in a process called “link 
analysis,” and apply those patterns to predict future outcomes.335 But not all statistical 
links are relevant, if relevance is defined as being meaningfully probative of future 
criminal activity. This section discusses three aspects of automated predictive policing 
software that might obscure the relevance or irrelevance of statistical links: (1) the 
deliberate search for non-obvious relationships; (2) “signal-to-noise” issues that confuse 
the relative strength of relationship; and (3) the potential lack of a clear logical nexus 
between variables. 
Some automated systems are designed to find subtle, “non-obvious” connections, 
which can skew analysis toward over-prediction at the expense of true relevance.336 Non-
Obvious Relationship Analysis (“NORA”) tools “can identify links and relationships not 
readily identifiable using traditional link analysis software.”337 NORA’s application to 
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law enforcement is based in part on the premise that sophisticated or organized criminals 
may intentionally obscure their information and associations.338 These analytical tools are 
more sensitive to subtleties.339 However, there is a direct tradeoff between this sensitivity 
and ensuring that the links identified are relevant.340 Data scientist Colleen McCue’s 
primer on predictive analytics provides an example of this tradeoff: “[NORA] tools [] can 
identify subtle changes in numeric information, such as social security numbers. In many 
cases, these transpositions are unintentional keystroke errors. In others, however, numeric 
information is changed slightly to reduce the likelihood that information will be linked 
directly, which can be indicative of identity theft or similar types of fraud.”341 Thus, there 
is a chance that a slightly altered social security number is indicative of identity theft, but 
it is more likely that the transposition means nothing. In this example, the subtlety of the 
link is inversely correlated with its probative value. While this sensitivity can be 
beneficial in some contexts, predictions that inform police interventions should err on the 
side of accuracy, since basic freedoms may be at stake and errors can be costly. 
Link analysis can show not only the existence of relationships but also their 
relative strength.342 If not carefully calibrated, however, automated systems can overstate 
the link strength, making connections seem stronger than they are.343 These errors are 
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caused by “uneven distributions” causing “signal-to-noise issues.”344 For example, 
algorithms may try to measure the strength of associations between individuals by 
analyzing the number of times those individuals have called one another.345 Analysts can 
set thresholds such that twenty calls indicate a strong relationship.346 However, some 
people make significantly more phone calls than others. People who make hundreds of 
calls per week may easily cross this twenty-call threshold with many of their contacts, 
while people who make fewer than twenty calls per week will appear to have no strong 
relationships. Thus, the relevance of phone calls may be underestimated or overestimated 
because of the thresholds and units of measurements chosen by analysts.347 
Determining relevance requires an understanding of the logical nexus between 
two statistically connected factors. The drug courier profile, for example, is composed of 
factors whose relationships to criminal activity can be intuited. Traveling under an 
alias,348 not checking baggage,349 and appearing nervous350 all are associated with fearing 
detection or trying to avoid detection; common sense dictates that a person selling 
narcotics would likely be traveling from a city known as a source of these drugs351 and 
that a person involved in a drug transaction might be carrying an unusually large amount 
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of currency.352 Each of these characteristics can describe innocent travelers, but each one 
bears a clear (if tenuous)353 relationship to the crime (or at least a crime). However, since 
automated systems are meant to surpass common sense,354 the links they discover might 
not share a readily discernible logical nexus. Some would argue that this is the point of 
automation—its added value is that it finds “surpris[ing]” patterns.355 McCue explained 
this value in terms of Wal-Mart’s success with predictive analytics: 
[W]hat can we learn from Wal-Mart and Amazon about 
fighting crime in a recession? . . . Wal-Mart as an 
organization has effectively leveraged large amounts of 
historical point-of-sale data in an effort to anticipate and 
effectively respond to their customers. In one particular 
example, the analysts at Wal-Mart noted unique patterns of 
purchasing behavior in advance of a major weather event. 
Specifically, sales of bottled water, duct tape, and Pop-
Tarts increased in the period of time immediately preceding 
a storm. While the bottled water and duct tape are obvious 
choices . . . the increased sales of Pop-Tarts is surprising. 
Therefore . . . the bottled water and duct tape represent 
“confirmation,” and the increased sales of Pop-Tarts would 
be “discovery” of new and ideally actionable relationships. 
It is important to note that while we can consider the 
possible motivations behind this behavior (e.g., Pop-Tarts 
are easy to store and prepare, do not require refrigeration, 
can be eaten directly out of the box), understanding the 
underlying reason for this is not necessary for it to be 
actionable. Knowing that consumers will be purchasing 
Pop-Tarts in anticipation of a major weather event is 
sufficient for Wal-Mart to adjust their supply chain and 
meet the need.356 
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In this example, McCue is probably correct that Wal-Mart does not need to know why 
people are buying Pop-Tarts before a storm in order to decide that it should increase its 
Pop-Tart supply. However, if Wal-Mart is wrong about the Pop-Tart-storm connection—
if sales are increasing for some reason unrelated to the storm—the only consequences are 
a surplus of Pop-Tarts and a very modest potential loss of profits. In the law enforcement 
context, faulty inferences can mean surveilling or even arresting the wrong person, or 
failing to stop a crime. The stakes are much higher, and the rigor of analysis should be 
higher as well. 
Reliability357 
Predictive models and the data they analyze must be reliable. This section 
discusses several factors that can compromise the reliability of automated profile-based 
predictions in the law enforcement context. First, inherent limitations in crime-related 
datasets can lead to flawed predictive models. Second, the reliability of predictive models 
can be difficult to evaluate because the models rely on changing the future by preventing 
crime and because they can create self-fulfilling prophecies by concentrating police 
attention on certain people.  
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Data Reliability 
Unreliable data can compromise automated predictions. In order to be reliable, the 
data that “teach” an algorithm how to predict a certain type of crime must accurately 
represent that crime. This is especially difficult to achieve in the law enforcement context 
for at least three reasons: (1) data about criminals is limited to those who got caught; (2) 
law enforcement recordkeeping practices have been historically inconsistent; and (3) 
more serious crimes, such as violent crimes, are relatively infrequent events. These 
factors tend to create data samples that are small, incomplete, and unrepresentative.  
Even if one had access to all records related to crime, the individuals represented 
in these data would be limited to those who have had some contact with the criminal 
justice system; the known criminals would only represent those who had been 
“caught.”358 Because of the limits of collecting crime data, “almost everything that we 
know about crime and criminals is based on a relatively small [sample] of information 
gathered from only a fraction of all criminals[.]”359 The sample is non-random, which 
makes it inherently less reliable than a random sample.360 From this already limited 
universe of information, analysts must compile and “scrub”361 data to create reliable 
samples from which automated systems can learn and develop rules for making 
predictions.  
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The task of creating reliable samples is further complicated by law enforcement 
agencies’ history of faulty recordkeeping practices.362 For example, some jurisdictions do 
not require police officers to record investigative stops that do not result in arrests.363 
Thus, data on these types of stops do not adequately represent the number or nature of 
false positives. The incomplete nature of available crime data means that even carefully 
scrubbed samples may be too small and unrepresentative to create reliable outcomes.  
 Some predictive policing models use commercially collected digital data, which is 
even less reliable than government records. For example, Beware, a pilot program in 
Fresno, California, that assigns “threat scores” of green, yellow, or red to individuals, 
uses information from commercial data brokers.364 Data brokers comb the Internet and 
compile available data on individuals. This can include everything from criminal records 
to social media activity to health information. Internet companies and data brokers are 
economically incentivized to collect as much information as they can, regardless of its 
accuracy. Information collected for one purpose is often compiled with other information 
and used for unanticipated purposes. The rules under which the data were originally 
collected may be unknown. For example, a commercial database may purport to show the 
names of individuals who have purchased assault weapons online, but it may not disclose 
how it defined “assault weapon.” Without knowing the collection rules and the reliability 
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controls employed by the original collecting entity, analysts may be less able to verify the 
reliability of these datasets.365   
The types of crimes that automated systems might attempt to predict, such as 
sexual assaults, murders, and other violent crimes, are “infrequent events,” which are 
inherently difficult to statistically predict.366 Predicting a specific type of crime requires 
exposing the predictive model to information about past crimes of the same type. The 
model learns the characteristics and factors associated with that crime and—in the case of 
automated profiling—with the individuals who commit those crimes. For relatively rare 
events, such as murders, the event sample size is small. The smaller the sample size, the 
more susceptible it is to statistical error, and the less reliable the results and predictions 
will be.367 As data scientist and predictive analytics expert Colleen McCue put it, “the 
fact that [violent crime] is a relatively infrequent event is a very good thing for almost 
everyone, except the analysts.”368 
McCue’s research shows that data on infrequent events can create flawed 
predictive models. She set out to create a model that would predict whether an armed 
robbery would escalate into an aggravated assault. However, the data showed that armed 
robberies escalated into aggravated assaults less than five percent of the time, making 
“robbery-related aggravated assaults” an infrequent event. McCue found that  
a very simple model can be created that has an accuracy 
rate of greater than 95%. In other words, this simple model 
could correctly predict the escalation of an armed robbery 
into an aggravated assault 95% of the time. At first blush, 	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this sounds phenomenal. . . . Examining the model further, 
however, we find a critical flaw: There is only one decision 
rule, and it is “no.” By predicting that an armed robbery 
will never escalate into an aggravated assault, the model 
would be correct 95% of the time, but it would not be very 
useful.369 
 
This example illustrates the importance of carefully parsing and evaluating the 
rules that automated systems use to make predictions. 
Falsifiability370 
The reliability of predictive models must be continually evaluated in the real 
world. Gathering and evaluating information about these systems’ accuracy rates may be 
complicated by at least two factors. First, when interventions are designed to prevent 
individuals from committing future crimes, it may be difficult to distinguish between 
successful interventions and false predictions. Imagine a police officer in Chicago 
receives a prediction that a resident is likely to commit a violent crime. The officer visits 
the resident’s home as part of Chicago’s Custom Notifications program371 and warns the 
resident about the consequences of committing violent crimes. If the resident is never 
caught committing, arrested for, or charged with a crime, how do police know whether 
the resident was deterred or if she never would have committed a crime in the first place?  
Should this be categorized as a successful intervention or a false prediction? Automated 
models whose success is based on changing the future might evade meaningful tests of 
reliability. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Id. 
 
370 Falsifiability refers to the ability of the models’ accuracy to be tested. 
 
371 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
	   81	  
Second, automated predictions used to inform surveillance discretion can create 
“feedback loops” or “self-fulfilling prophecies” that inflate accuracy levels.372 One of the 
likeliest uses of automated predictions will be to help police make decisions about whom 
to further surveil and investigate.373 Police are more likely to observe crime wherever 
they are focusing their surveillance.374 Thus, if predictions are used to train surveillance 
on specific individuals, those individuals are more likely to be caught committing crimes 
than are individuals who aren’t being closely watched. As predictive models learn from 
these results, over-reliance on predictions threatens to create a feedback loop in which 
predictions become increasingly focused on individuals with similar characteristics. In 
addition to disproportionately targeting minority groups, these results can obscure 
potential weaknesses in the models’ accuracy. 
Bias and Discrimination 
 Big data analytics are not inherently neutral. As Solon Barocas and Andrew 
Selbst have noted, “[T]he very point of data mining is to provide a rational basis upon 
which to distinguish between individuals.”375 Therefore, “[b]y definition, data mining is 
always a form of statistical (and therefore seemingly rational) discrimination.”376 Data 
mining and predictive analytics have been described as “brutally objective.”377 Indeed, 
predictive automated profiling systems make distinctions between or categorize 	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individuals based on statistical relationships objectively found in the input data. But the 
objective, unbiased nature of this process, and its ability to be an antidote for human bias 
and invidious discrimination, are often overstated. There are multiple opportunities 
throughout the data collection and coding processes for bias to skew the results of data 
mining. First, the datasets used to “teach” or train an algorithm can reflect individual and 
social biases that can be encoded into predictive models. Second, designing algorithms 
requires some human intervention. Humans can intentionally or unintentionally design 
algorithms that parse information in ways that disadvantage certain groups. At best, 
undetected and uncorrected bias can lead to unreliable predictions. At worst, it can result 
in predictive systems that discriminate against minority groups. 
Data Bias 
Automated predictions are only as good as their “training data”—the data from 
which algorithms learn relationships and patterns that they can use to make 
distinctions.378 Barocas and Selbst have catalogued several ways in which biased training 
data can skew results and lead to unfair discrimination.379 This section applies their 
research to the predictive policing context. 
Existing data can reflect human subjectivity and societal biases. According to 
Barocas and Selbst, “[I]f data mining treats cases in which prejudice has played some 
role as valid examples from which to learn a decision-making rule, that rule may simply 
reproduce the prejudice involved in these earlier cases.”380 This concern is particularly 
salient in the law enforcement context. Countless studies, investigations, and commentary 	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are dedicated to the role that bias—particularly racial bias—plays in police officers’ 
decisions to stop, search, and arrest individuals.381 These biases can also factor into 
convictions, sentencing, and parole decisions.382 Moreover, the role of bias in these 
decisions is difficult to detect. If it goes unchallenged, bias is unlikely to be detected. 
Thus, it is plausible that automated prediction software will treat a high number of cases 
in which bias played a role as legitimate. The racial or other biases of individual police 
officers and of society at large can be encoded into predictive algorithms. 
Relatedly, data samples can over- or under-represent certain minority groups. 
According to Barocas and Selbst, “[I]f data mining draws inferences from a biased data 
sample of the population to which inferences are expected to generalize, any decision that 
rests on these inferences may systematically disadvantage those who are under- or over-
represented in the dataset.”383 It is well documented that black men and women make up 
a disproportionately large percentage of those stopped by police, arrested,  and 
imprisoned. Forty percent of people incarcerated in the United States are black, despite 
the fact that only 13 percent of the U.S. population is black.384 Although studies show 
that people of color are no more likely to sell illegal drugs than whites, they have faced 
higher rates of drug arrests.385 Blacks and Hispanics are also more likely to be searched 
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during a traffic stop than whites.386 Since predictive policing relies on existing data to 
identify patterns, overrepresentations of racial minorities in the data could lead to 
discriminatory algorithms that reflect historical and persisting societal bias. 
For a real-world example of how biased data can skew results and disadvantage 
minorities, consider the smart phone application Street Bump. Street Bump detects and 
reports potholes in Boston by collecting data from residents’ smart phones as they drive 
through the city.387 In her article, Think Again: Big Data, Kate Crawford warned that 
“whatever information the city receives from [Street Bump] will be biased by the uneven 
distribution of smartphones across populations in different parts of the city.”388 This 
could result in underreporting and under-repairing of road problems in low-income 
communities where fewer people have smartphones. It is not enough for training datasets 
to be accurate and complete. Datasets should not be used to train predictive models 
unless analysts can come up with ways to find and correct for implicit bias. 
Coding Bias 
The word “automated” tends to evoke a process free of human intervention, but 
even automated, machine-learning systems involve some human subjectivity. The target 
variable that an algorithm is designed to determine (e.g., creditworthiness, likelihood of 
committing a crime) must be operationalized as variables that algorithms can discern 
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(e.g., good credit history, low education level).389 “Through this process of translation, [] 
data miners may unintentionally parse the problem and define the target variable in such 
a way that protected classes happen to be subject to systematically less favorable 
determinations.”390 The more complex and nuanced the target variable, the more human 
subjectivity will play into defining it. The likelihood that someone will commit a crime is 
shaped by an infinite number of factors, many of which are likely unobservable or 
unquantifiable (e.g., subjective state of mind). One Chicago program focuses on social 
connections within and between gangs, mapping people’s associations to attempt to 
determine who might commit a murder in the near future.391 Thus, this program has 
defined “likelihood of committing murder” as “connectivity to certain gang members.” 
This may be a rational way of distinguishing between people who are likely and unlikely 
to commit murders. But it may also subject certain classes of people—likely young black 
males—to disproportionate scrutiny. 
Even when predictive algorithm programmers are careful not to use race or class 
as factors, proxies for race and class may be introduced into the algorithm.392 As Barocas 
and Selbst have explained, this happens when “criteria that are genuinely relevant in 
making rational and well-informed decisions also happen to serve as reliable proxies for 
class membership.”393 These proxies tend to reveal existing historical inequalities. For 
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example, in the employment context, members of historically marginalized classes are 
more likely to lack the markers traditionally associated with prospective job success, such 
as education from an elite institution.394  
It is not difficult to imagine factors that may be associated with crime but are also 
proxies for race and class. As noted earlier, Chicago’s targeting of gang members likely 
affects predominantly young black men. Questionnaires designed to evaluate the 
likelihood of recidivism in parole candidates have asked about demographic factors such 
as education level and employment status,395 factors that also inversely correlate with 
being black and poor.396  
Discrimination by proxy may be particularly difficult to detect in an algorithm 
that uses computer learning to develop patterns. As algorithms learn, they begin to decide 
which factors are relevant to the target variable.397 Thus, police officers using the 
algorithm—and even the analysts who created it—may lack knowledge or control over 
the factors the algorithm is using and the weight it is assigning to those factors. This can 
make subtler forms of discrimination difficult to detect.398 The next section will address 
the opacity of algorithms more broadly. 
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Transparency 
The accountability of and the public’s trust in law enforcement agencies depend 
upon adequate transparency. The requirement that police officers be able to justify stops, 
searches, and seizures serves not only to protect people from arbitrary police action but 
also to provide an opportunity to challenge actions perceived as unjust infringements on 
liberty and privacy.399 This premium on transparency does not change when officer 
discretion is replaced by an algorithm that decides who should be a potential suspect. Yet 
police departments have been unwilling to release the predictive policing algorithms they 
use, or any details about how the algorithms work and what factors they look for.400 In 
their article, The Scored Society, Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale warned that 
predictive algorithms are “zealously guarded” and “shrouded in secrecy,” and therefore 
their decisions cannot be effectively challenged.401 
Transparency and accountability in policing are enforced in part by courts, which 
require officers to justify challenged searches and seizures.402 When automated 
prediction-based seizures are challenged in court, if officers are not required to testify to 
the factors underlying the predictions, or if they are allowed to shield such testimony 
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from public disclosure,403 the public will lose out on this detailed record of what police 
officers consider when they decide whether they have reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause to make a stop, search, or arrest. If police officers are going to seize individuals 
based on an automated profile, that profile effectively becomes a rule or policy that 
determines outcomes.404 As with other agency rules, the public is entitled to notice.405 
Aside from institutional secrecy, a special barrier to transparency of automated 
predictive policing may be the nature of the automation itself. Algorithms may be opaque 
to the police officers who use them.406 As algorithms learn new information, they 
continually adapt their decision-making formulae, which makes it easy for programmers 
or police officers to lose sight of precisely how decisions are being made. This can make 
discrimination and bias difficult to detect.407 
The limitations addressed so far concern specific aspects of automated prediction 
software and its implementation that raise policy challenges. These issues presumably 
can be addressed in the design, evaluation, and implementation of automated profiling 
systems. The following sections of this chapter address broader concerns about the 
philosophy and objectives underlying the adoption of automated prediction tools that 
attempt to quantify suspicion and sort individuals into risk categories. 	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Policing by the Numbers 
Predictive policing epitomizes a modern law enforcement culture that prioritizes 
statistics and measures success in terms of crime reduction. Predictive policing can be 
seen as an extension of the CompStat era of law enforcement. CompStat is a set of data-
driven policing methods introduced in the 1990s and used by police departments 
throughout the nation.408 It refers to a range of programs and methods through which 
police attempt to understand, control, and prevent crime using data analytics.409 
CompStat’s introduction was accompanied by required quotas for patrol officers and by 
“broken windows policing,” both of which were aimed at reducing overall crime rates by 
targeting small crimes, such as panhandling and loitering.410 While CompStat has been 
widely heralded for dramatically reducing crime in New York City,411 it has also been 
criticized for shifting the focus of policing to an over-emphasis on crime control at the 
expense of protecting democratic values.412 Starting in the 1990s, policing success came 
to be measured exclusively by crime rates. This mentality is associated with aggressive 
policing programs, such as stop-and-frisk, which have harmed police-community 
relations.413 
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Law enforcement rhetoric around predictive policing takes this crime-control 
mentality to the next level. According to McCue, “[O]nce we can anticipate or predict 
crime, we will have the ability to prevent it.”414 This statement is not only problematic 
because it assumes the success of predictive policing and the omnipotence of data. It also 
minimizes the notion that police should focus on understanding and ameliorating the 
broader social forces that contribute to crime. As Elizabeth Joh has argued, 
[A] technocratic solution to crime is not the only objective 
of democratic policing. Reducing crime is not the only job 
of the police. Policing as an institution has never been 
amenable to a single objective, and indeed over time its 
aims have shifted. What is clear, however, is that 
democratic policing aims at more than mere crime control 
and, at its core, relies on skills that do not always lend 
themselves to statistical analysis. No amount of data-driven 
policing is likely to assuage communities scoured by long 
histories of tension with the police. Nor will 
demonstrations of little red boxes on a smartphone 
necessarily justify to a community the need for a heavy-
handed police presence.415 
 
Undue reliance on automated predictions can dull officers’ perceptions. As 
McCue has pointed out, a predictive mindset does not always benefit police 
investigations.416 “[E]stablishing a mindset early in an investigation can significantly 
affect interpretation of subsequent leads and clues, allowing important evidence to be 
overlooked . . . .”417 There is no amount of data or magical formula that will lead to 
perfect or even near-perfect crime control; prioritizing data at the expense of holistic 
community policing is a fool’s errand. 	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System Avoidance 
As this thesis has suggested, predictive automated profiling systems are likely to 
lead to more non-Fourth Amendment, or “consensual” encounters.418 Courts maintain 
that these non-seizure police contacts work such small or negligible encroachments upon 
liberty and privacy interests that they do not trigger constitutional protections.419 But a 
recent study suggests that even low-level contact with police and the criminal justice 
system can have negative consequences. In an empirical study, Sarah Brayne found that 
individuals who have had contact with police are significantly “less likely to interact with 
surveilling institutions, [such as] medical, financial, labor market, and educational 
institutions, than their counterparts who have not had criminal justice contact.”420 Brayne 
has labeled this phenomenon “system avoidance,” and she found it even in individuals 
who had low-level contact with the system.421 Brayne noted that the effects of system 
avoidance may exacerbate marginalization along racial and class lines: 
Because criminal justice contact is disproportionately 
distributed . . . system avoidance is a potential mechanism 
through which the criminal justice system contributes to 
social stratification: it severs an already marginalized 
subpopulation from institutions that are pivotal to 
desistance from crime and their own integration into 
broader society.422 
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By increasing the frequency of police contact with civilians, predictive policing 
may encourage avoidance not only of traditional institutions but also of online activities. 
Evidence suggests that predictive policing models are designed to incorporate data about 
online activity, such as social networking.423 Websites, social media platforms, email 
providers, and cellular service providers are known for their record keeping. Individuals 
who want to avoid creating a digital trail because they are wary of surveillance may avoid 
using these tools. Today, email, social media, and online commerce are just as important 
as —if not more important than—traditional institutions for “integration into broader 
society.”424 This could widen the existing socioeconomic digital divide425 and inhibit 
people from filling out online job applications, communicating with others, and pursuing 
knowledge and entertainment. 
Brayne’s research corroborates anecdotal accounts of system avoidance. In her 
ethnography, On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City, Alice Goffman noted that in 
poor black neighborhoods where police raids and surveillance are constant, “young men 
cultivate unpredictability or altogether avoid institutions, places, and relations on which 
they formerly relied.”426 In one chapter, Goffman observed that the men avoided the 
hospital, in part because police officers habitually checked the emergency room sign-in 
sheet for names that might be “hot” (have outstanding warrants).427 The men also 
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“cultivate unpredictability” by avoiding established routines and by not being where 
people expect them to be.428 But is it possible to be unpredictable in a world where 
algorithms are constantly “learning” how to make ostensibly more reliable predictions 
about human behavior? The next section attempts to explore this question and to define 
the liberty interest in being unpredictable. 
The Right to be Unpredictable 
Predictive policing embodies what Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale refer to as 
“the scored society.”429 In the scored society, individuals are “tagged,” ranked, or rated 
by predictive algorithms for various purposes: 
Predictive algorithms mine personal information to make 
guesses about individuals’ likely actions and risks. A 
person’s on- and offline activities are turned into scores 
that rate them above or below others. Private and public 
entities rely on predictive algorithmic assessments to make 
important decisions about individuals.430 
 
Citron and Pasquale point out that predictive algorithms can “harm individuals’ life 
opportunities often in arbitrary and discriminatory ways.”431 In scoring, ranking, and 
categorizing individuals based on existing data, automated predictions threaten individual 
autonomy and self-determination.432 Julie Cohen has argued that autonomy “shelters 
[individual experimentation, creativity, and] subjectivity from the efforts of commercial 	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to privacy as “the fundamental freedom not to have one’s life too totally determined by a progressively 
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and government actors to render individuals and communities fixed, transparent, and 
predictable.”433 Total predictability robs individuals of the freedom to define and redefine 
themselves and to evolve from their pasts. 
Law enforcement often insists upon the need to predict behavior in order to 
maintain safety and fight crime.434 To be sure, total predictability would make fighting 
crime easier. But automated predictions are neither perfect nor neutral.435 At best, even 
the most statistically valid predictive algorithms will create false positives, since they 
operate based on probabilities, not absolutes. At worst, predictive policing can encode 
racial and socioeconomic bias.436 Moreover, totalitarian uses of surveillance to achieve 
predictability have chilling effects on expression and individualism.437 
The unpredictability described here is not synonymous with the right to avoid 
crime detection. Rather, it is a general freedom to participate in society, associate with 
others, and develop the self without fear that innocent activities will lead to pigeonholing 
predictions. It protects innocent individuals, individuals for whom police have not 
developed reasonable suspicion, and individuals who may be labeled at-risk of 
committing future crimes because of social or economic circumstances. It also protects 
formerly convicted individuals from unfounded assumptions of recidivism. In the analog 
world, people can selectively cultivate unpredictability, or what Woodrow Hartzog and 
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Evan Selinger refer to as “obscurity.”438 For example, some people leave their lights on 
when they’re not home so that potential robbers don’t learn their habits; some cross 
county lines to do their shopping and avoid nosy neighbors. But with algorithms that can 
analyze infinite amounts of data and continually adapt to new information, cultivating 
unpredictability or maintaining obscurity may be impossible. 
 The threat to liberty posed by total predictability may disparately impact the poor 
and communities of color, who tend to live under more persistent surveillance. For 
communities that are heavily surveilled, unpredictability may be a vital means of 
maintaining human dignity. Traditionally marginalized groups already struggle to 
overcome the roles and assumptions society imposes on them. Automated predictions, 
especially without transparency and adequate safeguards, could exacerbate the 
marginalization of protected groups.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed seven potential limitations and risks associated with 
automated profiling. Each of these issues should be considered by the data scientists 
developing automated predictive policing models, by the law enforcement agencies 
adopting these models, and by the policymakers determining whether and how to regulate 
predictive policing. These actors should not stop at acknowledging these limitations or at 
ensuring that predictive models are reliable. Before adopting big-data law enforcement 
solutions, stakeholders should consider the broader social consequences of relying on 
statistics and machine learning to predict human behavior and inform suspicion. Over-
reliance on predictive algorithms could dull officers’ judgment, exacerbate existing 	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tensions between law enforcement and communities, and chill online activity and 
associations. Accepting these consequences for the sake of catching more criminals 
would be antithetical to democratic values.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction  
 Automated profiling stands to fundamentally change the nature of policing and 
the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion inquiry by emphasizing the knowledge and 
inferences of a computer rather than those of a police officer. This chapter will 
summarize the findings discussed in the previous chapters and offer suggestions for how 
law enforcement agencies, policymakers, and software developers can minimize the civil 
liberties harms associated with automated profiling. 
Answers to Research Questions 
1. What have courts said about if or when using profiles as a basis for 
investigative stops violates the Fourth Amendment? What limits have 
they set on these practices? 
The Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion inquiry depends upon the specific 
facts observed by and known to the officer and the reasonable inferences drawn from 
those facts based on the officer’s experience. This inquiry remains the same when those 
facts are drawn from a predetermined profile. Courts have generally accepted the use of 
predetermined profiles as a basis for investigative stops, but they have refused to give 
talismanic significance to any particular profile as indicating reasonable suspicion. 
Factors from a predetermined profile can give rise to reasonable suspicion if the specific 
factors relied upon, in light of the totality of the circumstances, gave rise to an officer’s 
reasonable inference and criminal activity was afoot.  
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Courts disagree over whether the factors in the drug courier profile, without more, 
can justify reasonable suspicion. For a profile to justify reasonable suspicion, it must 
sufficiently narrow the pool of suspicious individuals such that it would not subject a 
large number of presumably innocent individuals to arbitrary seizures.  
Courts also emphasize officers’ training and experience, which allow officers to 
infer criminal activity from facially innocent behavior. A lack of experience with a 
particular profile or the inability to articulate one’s inferences can militate against finding 
that an officer’s inferences were reasonable.  
Although no federal appellate court has rejected the drug courier profile outright, 
many courts have expressed skepticism about the usefulness of the profile. This 
skepticism often stems from the profile’s malleability, the lack of proof of its statistical 
reliability, its tendency to lead to arbitrary seizures. 
2. What major problems does automated profiling present that the existing 
legal frameworks do not adequately address? 
The addition of machine learning to crime profiling will change the nature of the 
Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion inquiry by de-emphasizing the observations and 
inferences of police officers. Police officers may have difficulty ascertaining and 
testifying to the underlying logic and facts contributing to an automated prediction. In the 
moment that an officer decides to act on a prediction, there are likely to be discrepancies 
between what the officer knows and what the predictive algorithm knows. This will alter 
the officer’s role in the decision about whether to seize a person, which will present 
challenges for the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion inquiry, which focuses on the 
facts observed and known to the officer, the officer’s experience, and the officer’s 
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rational inferences. Although algorithms are capable of analyzing far more information 
than human police officers, they are not designed to assess the totality of the 
circumstances in a particular moment in time, which is the crux of the reasonable 
suspicion inquiry. Courts may view the automated nature of automated profiling as 
overly formulaic and contributing to arbitrary seizures by dulling the officer’s 
perceptions and decision-making abilities. On the other hand, courts may view the 
consistency and the empirical nature of automated decisions as a positive check on 
officer discretion that may actually limit arbitrary seizures. Automated profiling is more 
likely to result in “consensual” police interventions that do not fall under the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections. However, these consensual encounters may still evolve into 
seizures. Automated predictions may not have the same degree of temporal exigency as 
typical law enforcement decisions to perform Terry stops. Automated predictions are 
designed to indicate that someone will commit a crime at some point in the future, but 
they do not necessarily indicate that someone is committing or is about to commit a 
crime—the current standard for reasonable suspicion. 
3. What limitations and policy considerations should data scientists, law 
enforcement agencies, and policymakers consider before designing, 
implementing, and regulating automated profiling models? 
Automated predictive models are not inherently neutral. Many factors, including 
unreliable data, human subjectivity, and oversensitivity, can compromise the relevance 
and reliability of predictive models, which can lead to discrimination and can 
compromise civil liberties. Automated predictive models are designed to be much more 
sensitive to associational patterns than humans are. This can lead predictive models to 
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find statistical associations that are not particularly probative of crime and should not be 
considered relevant factors in decisions about whether to investigate an individual. 
However, predictive models may actually overstate the relevance of these connections if 
they are not carefully calibrated. It is difficult to come up with a reliable sample of crime 
data. Crime data are limited to instances where criminals “got caught;” law enforcement 
has been historically inconsistent in its data collection and recordkeeping practices, and 
serious crimes are “infrequent events,” which create smaller and less reliable samples. 
The use of commercially available digital data exacerbates this problem, since such 
datasets tend to be incomplete. Predictive models may be difficult to falsify because their 
goal is to predict and alter the future by preventing crimes and because they can cause 
self-fulfilling prophecies by focusing police attention on particular individuals. Predictive 
models can encode individual and societal biases, which can lead to discrimination 
against minority groups that is difficult to detect. The private ownership of predictive 
algorithms, as well as the inherently opaque nature of machine learning, can frustrate 
government openness. Predictive policing encourages a law enforcement culture 
characterized by an over-reliance on statistics and crime control at the expense of holistic 
protection of legal rights and democratic values. Overreliance on automated predictions 
may also exacerbate the phenomenon of system avoidance that disproportionately 
discourages poor and black individuals from participating in social institutions.  
4. How can some of the problems identified in the answers to research 
questions two and three be addressed? 
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The following section answers this question by reflecting on the foregoing 
research and offering practical principles for adopting, using, and regulating automated 
profiling in ways that reduce potential harm. 
Conclusions and Guidelines for Minimizing the Potential Harms Associated with 
Automated Profiling 
 
The term “hot” is used colloquially to describe people who may be in trouble with 
the law. Traditionally, this includes people with outstanding arrest warrants, people who 
are carrying contraband, or people who have been involved in an unsolved crime. “Hot” 
people are those who have a tangible reason to fear that, if identified by police, they will 
be arrested. Predictive policing is changing what it means to be hot by increasing the 
scope of information—and the capabilities to process it—that can lead to an individual 
being targeted for investigation. As algorithms attempt to predict crimes well in advance 
of a criminal act, the facts that form the basis of suspicion will be necessarily attenuated 
from the crime itself. Automated predictive software may make it easier for police to 
predict crime. At the same time, these tools will make it harder for individuals to predict 
whether they are hot. The law enforcement community would argue—perhaps 
justifiably—that this is a good thing. This one-way predictability will make it easier for 
police to catch criminals while making it harder for criminals to evade police. But it also 
means that anyone—innocent or not—can become the subject of suspicion for reasons 
beyond his or her control. The comforting maxim that those who have nothing to hide 
have nothing to fear no longer applies. This leaves individuals to worry that their 
otherwise innocent activities—particularly those conducted or recorded online—will 
subject them to police scrutiny and possibly even arrest by marking them as a 
probabilistic criminal. This could have chilling effects on online and offline conduct, 
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particularly on speech and associational activities. These effects will likely be 
concentrated among low-income and black individuals, who are already more likely to be 
stopped by police and arrested. 
Given that the statistical science of automated crime prediction is in its infancy, 
the current benefits of automated profiling may not be worth the risks to civil liberties. It 
would behoove law enforcement and government agencies to carefully consider these 
tradeoffs before implementing predictive policing programs. Nonetheless, law 
enforcement agencies across the country have already adopted some of these tools and 
are deploying them in communities. The following is a list of recommendations for 
minimizing the harms associated with automated profiling. This is not meant to be a 
comprehensive list of guidelines for predictive policing. It is merely a modest answer to 
some of the problems this thesis has documented.  
1. Before developing predictive software, data scientists should seek to 
answer whether a particular type of crime can be reliably predicted. Some types of crime 
may lack adequate data or patterns to support reliable predictions, as in McCue’s example 
of armed robberies that escalate into aggravated assaults. Since infrequent events create 
smaller and less reliable sample datasets, attempting to predict rare crimes may be more 
harmful than helpful. 
2. Automated predictions should provide officers with as much underlying 
information as possible in a useful format. The prediction should provide not only the 
what (the crime likely to occur) or the who (the likely suspect) but also the why. It should 
tell the police officer which factors or characteristics indicate that an individual is at risk 
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of committing a crime. This can allow the officer to better evaluate the usefulness of the 
prediction given the totality of the circumstances. 
3. Police officers should engage carefully with predictions and question their 
accuracy and usefulness, rather than taking them at face value. Although algorithms can 
analyze information in ways that the human brain cannot, police officers are in a better 
position to assess whether the circumstances surrounding a prediction warrant an 
intervention. Thus, policies that call for officers to act on every prediction—such as 
Chicago’s Custom Notifications program—are unwise. Automated predictions should not 
completely supersede or dictate officers’ judgment. 
4. Before any data are entered into an automated prediction system, their 
reliability should be verified by experts. At least one automated predictive policing 
system, Hunchlab, currently claims that officers can input any dataset they want into the 
system and that Hunchlab will decide how to process the data. However, it is unclear 
whether and how these datasets would be subjected to reliability tests and controls or 
“scrubbing.” Programmers and officers should work together to determine which datasets 
to input into predictive software, the reliability of those datasets, and how to treat the 
information.  
5. The law enforcement community should not take for granted that all non-
Fourth Amendment police-citizen encounters are benign or beneficial. Fourth 
Amendment law treats these encounters as negligible encroachments upon liberty 
interests, and predictive policing programs that emphasize intervention suggest that such 
encounters can be beneficial. However, even low-level police intervention can have 
chilling consequences, discouraging individuals from interacting with recordkeeping 
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institutions for fear that they are being surveilled. Home visits, such as those 
recommended by Chicago’s Custom Notifications program, should not be taken lightly. 
6. Law enforcement agencies should provide information to the public about 
which predictive systems they are using, how they are using them, how the systems 
operate, and any rules or guidelines they follow when using the systems. Transparency 
regarding predictive systems and practices is an important prerequisite to public trust in 
law enforcement. 
7. When prediction-based seizures are challenged, courts should require 
officers to testify to the prediction’s underlying justification—including the criteria 
giving rise to the prediction—in open court, and the record of this testimony should be 
publicly available. The requirement that officers articulate the facts giving rise to 
reasonable suspicion has provided the public, as well as attorneys and judges, with a 
record showing which circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion and which 
circumstances fell short of this standard. If the facts and reasoning underlying automated 
predictions are allowed to remain under seal, this important record—a mechanism for 
keeping legal institutions accountable—will be lost. 
Questions for Further Research 
Because little is publicly known about the algorithms and data used in predictive 
policing models and the policies police follow when using them, future research should 
attempt to discover and discuss these details. Computer science experts should weigh in 
on the existence of reliable methods of ensuring that automated profiling models and the 
data they use don’t create predictions that consider race, economic status, or other 
improper factors, including proxies for these characteristics.  
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